

Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory

Force-on-Force Experiments

Peace Keeping Operations (PKO) and
Peace Enforcement Operations (PEO)

North Little Rock, Arkansas



To improve Naval expeditionary warfighting capabilities across the spectrum of conflict for current and future operating forces.

Company Level Experiments

Experiment After Action Report

18-21 February 2002



**UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS
MARINE CORPS WARFIGHTING LABORATORY
MARINE CORPS COMBAT DEVELOPMENT COMMAND
QUANTICO, VIRGINIA 22134-5096**

IN REPLY REFER TO:
3900
C52

From Commanding General

Subj: PROJECT METROPOLIS INFANTRY PLATOON LEVEL EXPERIMENTS
AFTER ACTION REPORT.

Encl: (1) Project Metropolis After Action Report

1. This report gathers, organizes and synthesizes knowledge from live, force-on-force experiments conducted by the Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory (MCWL). We conducted these experiments during the period 18-21 March 2002 in North Little Rock, Arkansas.

2. MCWL conducted experiments with Marines from Company K, 3rd Battalion, 8th Marines, 4th Marine Expeditionary Brigade (Antiterrorism), Second Marine Division. These experiments occurred on urbanized terrain—the city streets of North Little Rock against a dedicated opposition force.

3. These experiments looked at ways to assess and develop tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs) used by Marines at the rifle company level in Peace Keeping Operations (PKO) and Peace Enforcement Operations (PEO) during military operations on urbanized terrain (MOUT).

4. Although much more experimentation is needed, our initial results are positive.

5. We will continue to search for better ways to fight and win more effectively and efficiently across the spectrum of conflict for current and future operating forces.

WILLIAM D. CATTO

Distribution:
CG, MCCDC
WDID
TECOM

MAWTS

HQMC:

DC A

DC PP&O

DC P&R

DIR, C4

CG, MARCORSYSCOM

CG, MARFORPAC

CG, MARFORLANT

CG, MARFORRES

CG, I MEF

CG, II MEF

CG, III MEF

CG, 1st MARDIV

CG, 2nd MARDIV

CG, 3rd MARDIV

CG, 4th MARDIV

CG, 1st MAW

CG, 2nd MAW

CG, 3rd MAW

CG, 4th MAW

TD, ONR

Table of Contents

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY	1
SECTION I EXPERIMENT OVERVIEW.....	3
THE THREE BLOCK WAR.....	5
BACKGROUND.....	5
VENUE	5
FORCES	5
<i>Task Organization</i>	<i>5</i>
HYPOTHESIS.....	6
<i>Tactical Objectives.....</i>	<i>6</i>
<i>Training Objectives</i>	<i>6</i>
CONDUCT OF THE EXPERIMENT.....	7
<i>Table 1 Top-Level Experiment Schedule</i>	<i>7</i>
OBSERVER CONTROLLER ACTIONS	8
EXPERIMENT MISSIONS.....	9
EXPERIMENT LIMITING FACTORS	9
EXPERIMENT RESULTS: TACTICAL OBJECTIVES	11
<i>Observations.....</i>	<i>14</i>
<i>Opinions.....</i>	<i>14</i>
<i>Patrol Base Forces/Organization.....</i>	<i>15</i>
<i>Operations Tempo</i>	<i>15</i>
<i>Task Organization.....</i>	<i>16</i>
<i>Table 2 Company COC Personnel.....</i>	<i>16</i>
<i>Specific Company Patrol Base Operations Areas Needing Further Development.....</i>	<i>17</i>
<i>Quick Reaction Force (QRF): MOUT Issues.....</i>	<i>18</i>
<i>Snipers.....</i>	<i>18</i>
<i>Combined Antiarmor Team (CAAT) / Heavy Machine Gun Teams.....</i>	<i>19</i>
<i>Booby traps and IEDs</i>	<i>19</i>
EXPERIMENT RESULTS: COMMUNICATIONS	21
AN/PRC-148 MBITR, PERSONAL ROLE RADIO, AND ICOM (ISR) RADIO AND HEADSET FEEDBACK.....	21
<i>Table 3 Quality of Training</i>	<i>22</i>
<i>Table 4 Ease of Use</i>	<i>22</i>
<i>Table 5 Ease of Changing Frequencies</i>	<i>23</i>
<i>Table 6 Difficulty In Using Two Radios.....</i>	<i>24</i>
<i>Table 7 Transmissions Per Hour.....</i>	<i>24</i>
<i>Table 8 Receptions Per Hour</i>	<i>25</i>
<i>Table 9 Average Transmission Time (seconds).....</i>	<i>25</i>
<i>Table 10 Length of Incoming Messages (seconds).....</i>	<i>26</i>
<i>Table 11 Frequency of Type of Message</i>	<i>27</i>
<i>Table 12 Battery Reliability and Endurance.....</i>	<i>27</i>
<i>Table 13 Mission Effectiveness</i>	<i>28</i>
<i>Table 14 General Problems.....</i>	<i>29</i>
<i>Table 15 Ruggedness.....</i>	<i>30</i>
<i>Table 16 Carry Location.....</i>	<i>30</i>
<i>Table 17 Interference With Use Of Weapon</i>	<i>31</i>
<i>Table 18 Headset Use</i>	<i>32</i>
<i>Table 19 Headset Comfort.....</i>	<i>33</i>
<i>Table 20 Ways to Improve the Radio.....</i>	<i>34</i>
<i>Table 21 Ways to Improve the Head Set.....</i>	<i>34</i>
<i>Table 22 Should Every Rifle Platoon Have this Capability.....</i>	<i>34</i>

EXPERIMENT RESULTS: TRAINING OBJECTIVES36
 Table 23 Overall Course Rating.....36
TABLE 24 TRAINING DAYS NEEDED38

SECTION II: DETAILED DESCRIPTIONS OF EXPERIMENT EVENTS...39

EVENT ONE.....40
 EVENT ONE FEEDBACK SUMMARY..... 41
EVENT TWO45
 EVENT TWO FEEDBACK SUMMARY..... 46
EVENT THREE.....51
 EVENT THREE FEEDBACK SUMMARY..... 52
EVENT FOUR.....56
 EVENT FOUR FEEDBACK SUMMARY 57
EVENT FIVE.....62
 EVENT FIVE FEEDBACK SUMMARY..... 63
EVENT SIX70
 EVENT SIX FEEDBACK SUMMARY..... 71
EVENT SEVEN.....75
 EVENT SEVEN FEEDBACK SUMMARY..... 76
EVENT EIGHT83
 EVENT EIGHT FEEDBACK SUMMARY..... 84
EVENT NINE.....88
 EVENT NINE FEEDBACK SUMMARY..... 89
EVENT TEN.....93
 EVENT TEN FEEDBACK SUMMARY..... 94
EVENT ELEVEN..... 101
 EVENT 11 FEEDBACK SUMMARY 102

Executive Summary

1. The Project Metropolis (ProMet) team from the Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory (MCWL) conducted experiments to evaluate and develop tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs) used at the rifle company level during peace keeping operations (PKO) and peace enforcement operations (PEO). The experiment hypothesis was:

"That properly trained MAGTFs can conduct peacekeeping operations in the urban environment and be prepared to transition seamlessly to higher intensity urban operations with minimum own force and noncombatant casualties, and controlled collateral damage."

2. North Little Rock, Arkansas (NLR) is a city of 60,000 people. Significant points about this Venue are:
 - a. MCWL seized the opportunity to evaluate the TTPs in a real functioning city.
 - (1) To enhance challenges and realism.
 - b. NLR embraced our presence in a most positive and supportive manner.
 - c. The city provided an extensive military support structure to draw from, including
 - (1) USMC I&I, and
 - (2) US Army Reserve, National Guard, and Air National Guard.
 - d. Using these established military elements for support significantly reduced billeting, subsistence, TOT and TOP expenses.
3. Experimental objectives were designed to generate output on *both* tactical and training issues. For example, the tactical effort was framed against specific TTPs taught in the Basic Urban Skills Training (BUST) package used in pre-experiment training. The information sought on training focused on the classic training typology of content, frequency of instruction and training facilities.
4. After completion of the BUST at Camp Lejeune in January 2002—but prior to arriving in NLR for the experiment—Kilo Company joined 78 new Marines from the School of Infantry (SOI). These new, inexperienced Marines had zero exposure to BUST and the very TTPs upon which the experiment was designed. This not only impacted the operational effectiveness of the company, it also skewed the integrity of the data collected on the evaluation of training objectives during operations.
5. During execution of experiment events, the Marines in Kilo Company, especially the leadership, compared favorably with all of the other Marine Corps units with whom we have experimented. While we only achieved limited success in evaluating TTPs, we saw well disciplined, highly motivated Marines execute their assigned missions to the maximum extent. Highly experienced O/Cs saw steady progress and detailed understanding as Marines applied the BUST TTPs. While not giving us the volume of the data/information we had hoped for, it did confirm the easy-to-grasp linkage between fundamental warfighting skills and the BUST TTPs over a reasonable period of time, and the ability of NCOs who did go through BUST to pass on their knowledge during practical application.

6. Each of the eleven (11) individual missions conducted during operations in NLR began and ended using the satellite patrol (urban maneuver) movement technique. All experiment output confirms the tactical viability of this patrolling technique.
 7. Perhaps the biggest output of the experiment was the knowledge gained about manning and operation of the company firm base. In short, it appears that a rifle company cannot effectively accomplish this mission without significant augmentation from the battalion in terms of internal and external security, additional rifles to arm personnel armed with pistols who have to stand security watch, and intelligence support.
-

SECTION I EXPERIMENT OVERVIEW

The Three Block War.

"In one moment in time in the same urban area, our Marines are feeding and clothing displaced refugees—providing humanitarian assistance. In the next moment, they are holding two warring tribes apart—conducting peacekeeping operations. In yet another part of the city, they are fighting a highly lethal battle against a determined foe. All on the same day, all within three city blocks. This is what we call the three block war."

**General Charles C. Krulak, USMC
31st Commandant of the Marine Corps**

Background. The Project Metropolis (ProMet) team from the Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory (MCWL) conducted urban security operations experiments in North Little Rock, Arkansas (NLR) during the period 18 through 21 February 2002. This is the second experiment focused on developing and evaluating tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) for Marines to use during Peace Keeping Operations (PKO) and Peace Enforcement Operations (PEO) during military operations on urbanized terrain (MOUT). The pivot point of this experiment was the transition between “Block Two” (peacekeeping) and “Block III” (lethal combat) — and back again to Block II. The previous experiment was focused at the platoon level, so this experiment moved forward to experiment with Rifle Company TTPs.

Venue. NLR is a city of 60,000 people. Major John Anderson, I&I for 3rd Bn, 23rd Marines based in NLR, recommended that we come there. Significant points about this Venue are:

- MCWL seized the opportunity to evaluate the TTPs in a real functioning city.
 - To enhance challenges and realism.
- NLR embraced our presence in a most positive and supportive manner.
- The city provided an extensive military support structure to draw from, including
 - a) USMC I&I, and
 - b) US Army Reserve, National Guard, and Air National Guard.
- Using these established military elements for support significantly reduced billeting, subsistence, TOT and TOP expenses.

Forces. CG, II MEF designated a company from the 4th Marine Expeditionary Brigade (Anti-Terrorism) (4th MEB (AT)) as the experiment force. The ProMet team trained portions of two 4th MEB (AT) infantry companies in Camp Lejeune during November through January, utilizing an abbreviated version of the Basic Urban Skills Training (BUST) package that incorporated portions of previously developed and evolving lessons.

After completion of the BUST at Camp Lejeune in January 2002—but prior to arriving in NLR for the experiment—Kilo Company joined 78 new Marines from the School of Infantry (SOI). These new, inexperienced Marines had zero exposure to BUST and the very TTPs upon which the experiment was designed. This not only impacted the operational effectiveness of the company, it also skewed the integrity of the data collected on the modified BUST training package.

Task Organization. Because of their specialized AT mission, Kilo Company's Table of Organization (T/O) is different from a standard Marine infantry company as follows:

- Each rifle squad has nine (9) Marines vice the standard 13.

- Platoon strength is three squads of 9 (total of 27 Marines);
 - vice the standard three squads of 13 (total of 39 Marines).

Hypothesis. The basic hypothesis for the experiment was:

"That properly trained MAGTFs can conduct peacekeeping operations in the urban environment and be prepared to transition seamlessly to higher intensity urban operations, with minimum noncombatant casualties, controlled collateral damage, and friendly casualties of less than 20%."

Experiment Objectives. The experiment had both Tactical and Training objectives. They were:

Tactical Objectives.

1. Do the urban combined arms combat formations developed for platoons and companies; enable seamless transition between Block 2 to Block 3 operations?
2. Are the escalation of force TTPs adequate?
3. Are the patrol satelliting concepts appropriate for urban patrols in Block 2 and 3 situations?
4. Are the TTPs for vehicle and personnel searches/ check points adequate?
5. Are the TTPs for hasty building searches adequate?
6. Are the TTPs for selecting, occupying, and operating out of urban patrol bases adequate?
7. What special C2 TTPs need to be developed to command and control units operating in the Block 2 and 3 urban environment?
8. Are the TTPs for medical evacuation and resupply adequate?

Training Objectives. These focused on the classic training issues of content, frequency and facilities. Specifically:

1. What topics should the training package include to prepare individuals, teams, and units to conduct combined arms offensive and defensive combat operations in the urban environment? (This is oriented towards determining what individual, team, and unit introductory training is required.)
2. What instructional methods should be used for individual, team, and unit introductory training to prepare Marines to conduct combined arms offensive and defensive combat operations in the urban environment?
3. What TTPs should be included for platoon and company sized combined arms team to conduct offensive, defensive, and security operations in the urban environment?
4. What initial training—time and content—does a platoon or company sized combined arms team need to develop adequate proficiency to conduct combined arms operations in the urban environment?
5. What refresher and sustainment training—time, content, and frequency—is required for a platoon or company sized combined arms team to maintain its proficiency level to effectively conduct combined arms operations in the urban environment?
6. What facilities are required to properly train individuals, teams, and units?

Conduct of the Experiment

Training. The ProMet team trained the experiment force using the latest version of the Basic Urban Skills Training (BUST) package. The twofold reason for this training was:

- Ensure the experiment forces have a baseline for urban warfighting.
- Increase the probability that the participants would use the TTPs to be evaluated by the Laboratory.

BUST was tailored to fit into the time available and to meet the requirements of the experiment scenario. *See annex A for the detailed training schedule.*

The ProMet staff conducted three days of refresher training at Camp Lejeune 11-13 February.

Experiment Outline. Scenarios revolved around a mythical country where two competing paramilitary elements combined asymmetric and terrorist tactics to leverage dissatisfactions among noncombatants who opposed one another.

- BLUFOR commanders were provided *Special Situations* as part of a frag order prior to each experiment event.
- The experiment followed a force-on-force structured free-play format over a continuous 72-hour period that was monitored by Observer Controllers (O/Cs).
- The ProMet staff controlled both OPFOR and role players to ensure training and experimentation goals were achieved.
- Each role player was given a specific identity and role for each event.
- Experimentation occurred 18 February to 21 February.
 - The after action review (AAR) was conducted on 22 February.
- The initial experiment day was a rehearsal day, and was followed by a series of discrete experiment situations designed and conducted to meet the specific goals of the experiment over the 72-hour period.
- Exercise Control (EXCON) used a master event list to introduce activities into the general tactical situation.
- Table 1 is the top-level experiment schedule.

17 FEB	18 FEB	19 FEB	20 FEB	21 FEB	22 FEB
ProMet O/C training / Experiment prep	Experiment Day. Dress rehearsal	Experiment Day	Experiment Day	Experiment Day	AAR

Table 1 Top-Level Experiment Schedule

A concept outline was provided to the task force commander as a warning order to enable basic mission planning as early as practical for each event. Specific missions were then issued as part of frag orders passed down from HHQ (EXCON). Here is a general outline for each event:

- EXCON
 - Confirms focus of experiment event.
 - Confirms scenario and finalizes frag order.

- Issues frag order to experiment force commander.
- Event team leader briefs O/Cs, OPFOR, and role players.
- Safety brief in company firm base area.
- Experiment force prep time.
- Experiment force issues order.
- Confirmation brief to experiment forces and O/Cs.
- Experiment force rehearsals in the company firm base area.
- Conduct the experiment event.
 - Unit conducts tactical debrief and O/Cs reconstruct event.
 - O/Cs and EXCON provide feedback to experiment force.
 - O/Cs conduct detailed debrief of elements.
 - Data packages turned in to Lead Analyst.
- The focus of the following day was metered based upon the findings of the previous day's events. EXCON and key personnel met daily in the afternoon during the unit's "resupply" to review the days event.

Experiment Adjudication. Force-on-force events utilized a combination of blanks, MILES 2000, and subjective "calls" by O/Cs. O/Cs were subject matter experts (SMEs) sourced from MCWL, The Basic School, Command and Control Systems School, the Canadian Infantry School, II MEF, Marine Corps Base Camp Lejeune, 1st Marine Division Schools and MP Company.

Observer Controller Actions.

- O/Cs were familiar with weapons effects, data collection procedures, and given an orientation to the BUST TTPs.
- O/Cs were formed into these teams:
 - Company HQ/firm base.
 - One per infantry fire team or satelliting element.
- O/C Team Leader:
 - Coordinated with EXCON and was responsible for ensuring that each event was conducted in accordance with the master event list and scenario.
 - Supervised the tactical debrief and subsequent end of event data collection effort.
- The O/Cs:
 - Tracked the unit through mission work-up, attending mission briefs and rehearsals.
 - Moved with the unit during the event observing, recording activities, and adjudicating engagements as required.
 - Maintained an activity log to record their element's actions.
 - Participated in the reconstruction at the end of the event.
 - Guided their element through a detailed debrief, where they fill out an event questionnaire and collect casualty forms, following the reconstruction and feedback to the participants.
 - Ensure completion and submission of activity log, event questionnaire, and casualty forms (making up the "data package") to the Lead Analyst when each event debrief is completed.

Experiment Missions. There were eleven (11) individual missions conducted during operations in NLR. Each of the 11 events began and ended using the satellite patrol (urban maneuver) movement technique. For more details see annex A - Event Summaries. The tasks conducted during the 11 missions were:

- Security patrols:
 - Seven (7) daytime.
 - Three (3) night.
- One (1) hasty vehicle checkpoint (VCP).
- Two 2 “Snap” (immediate) VCPs.
- House searches:
 - Two (2) daytime, and
 - One (1) night.
- One (1) company (-) raid.

Experiment Engagements. There were four (4) contact engagements between BLUFOR elements and OPFOR (not including the final raid). They were:

- Two (2) during house searches
 - One (1) daytime, and
 - One (1) at night.
- One (1) during a night security patrol.
- One (1) as patrol was leaving the patrol base.

Experiment Limiting Factors. The conduct and output of this experiment should be framed against the following four elements of essential information:

1. All of our knowledge from designing, developing, implementing and evaluating the BUST syllabus indicates that it takes three (3) continuous training weeks to achieve a working *familiarity* with MOUT TTPs.
 - a) We have confirmed knowledge synthesized over two years of MOUT experimentation, that it takes an additional two (2) weeks of practical application, rehearsals and repeated drills to develop individual and unit *proficiency*.
2. Due to real world operational exigencies, the unit taking part in this experiment had only a total of twelve (12) days of the BUST program.
3. After completion of the BUST at Camp Lejeune in January 2002—but prior to arriving in NLR for the experiment—Kilo Company joined 78 new Marines from the School of Infantry (SOI).
 - a) These new, inexperienced Marines received a three-day MOUT TTP orientation conducted by their parent unit before applying them in the experiment. Thus, these Marines had little to no experience with the individual BUST TTPs, and zero time to develop proficiency with the specific TTPs upon which the experiment was designed.
 - b) This not only impacted the operational effectiveness of the company, it also skewed the integrity of the data collected on the modified BUST training package.
4. During execution of experiment events, the Marines in Kilo Company, especially the leadership, compared favorably with all of the other Marine Corps units with whom we have experimented. While we only achieved limited success in evaluating TTPs, we saw well disciplined, highly motivated Marines execute their assigned missions to the maximum extent.

- a) Highly experienced O/Cs saw steady progress and detailed understanding as Marines applied the BUST TTPs. While not giving us a lot of the data/information we had hoped for, it did confirm the easy-to-grasp linkage between fundamental warfighting skills and the BUST TTPs over a reasonable period of time.
-

Experiment Results: Tactical Objectives

The following results are in terms of answers to the tactical objectives cited earlier.

1. Do the urban TTPs developed for platoons and companies; enable seamless transition between Block 2 and Block 3 operations?

Due to the limitations identified earlier, it was difficult to effectively assess many of the TTPs. However, we saw that units, teams, and individuals had difficulty transitioning from Block 2 to Block 3. This is consistent with findings from previous experiments with non-BUST units. And, it was clear that it was less difficult going from Block 3 (lethal combat) situations back down to Block 2—once it could be determined that the engagement had ended

- Participants stated that they thought they could mitigate this by rehearsing various immediate action (IA) drills and establishing SOPs and code words applicable to shifting from Block 2 to Block 3.

Unfortunately, we were not able to generate statistically significant data on our recently developed TTPs, such as team bounding and overwatch and some individual forcible entry techniques.

2. Are Escalation of Force TTPs adequate?

The escalation of force TTPs seemed to be adequate for the situations presented during the experiment. These TTPs are driven by the rules of engagement (ROE). Marines showed an understanding how ROE govern the way they apply *any* and *all* TTPs. Even though there a few “tense moments” (contrived by the Master Event List) we did not note any problems with inappropriate use of force.

- BLUFOR did not have all the non-lethal assets normally available to a deploying unit, but there were not any situations where they were needed
 - O/Cs and SMEs and some participants did comment during the AAR, that it might have been useful if they had flash bangs, NL shot gun rounds, and tazers available.

3. Are the patrol satelliting concepts appropriate for urban patrols in Block 2 and 3 situations?

Summary Assessment.

Satelliting continues to be a viable concept. All participants (BLUFOR, OPFOR, and O/Cs) agreed to this assessment. Though satelliting was taught and practiced in the MOUT site at Camp Lejeune, the units experienced initial difficulty with the technique in NLR because of the much greater area of responsibility. But, by the third day, the units were executing the technique with greater confidence and effectiveness. This is consistent with previous data on how long it takes to move from just being familiar with a technique to being proficient with a technique.

- OPFOR stated that on occasions they had problems dealing with the dispersed, unpredictable and seemingly random movement of the patrol sub-elements. Overall, it made OPFOR operations more risky and difficult.
 - This is the intent of the technique.

- Participants expressed some concern that "wandering and isolated" fire teams may get cut off and could not be reinforced in time. Others noted a need to develop better control procedures when employing mobile elements operating in HMMWVs.
- Additional work is needed to refine and develop better battle drills and code words, such as "go deep", contact left, reinforcing another team in trouble, counter sniper, etc.

Preparation for combat and procedures for patrols/rehearsals.

- Patrol leaders and squad leaders were adamant on the importance of *all patrol members* understanding commander's intent, mission, and the planned and alternate route.
 - Not only those going on the patrol, but also everyone involved in supporting patrol because many of the problems that arose during patrols could be traced back to lack of proper patrol prep.
 - All should attend patrol briefs and participate in rehearsals because of way the urban terrain segments and tends to isolate the formations and interferes with the ability to follow a planned route.
- Certain IA drills, SOPs, and actions at the objective should be rehearsed. However the very limited size of the assigned patrol base made it difficult to effectively rehearse. This problem of space is probably not unrealistic and units will have to conduct rehearsals outside the safety of the patrol base. This would require a security force to cover the rehearsal and the rehearsal would have to be treated as a mission in itself - passage of lines, fire support plan, coordination with higher, etc.
- Many participants stated they were carrying too much equipment thereby interfering with their mobility and their ability to perform certain functions - especially car and personnel searches.
 - They suggested that element leaders evaluate the mission and situation and equip the patrol accordingly.
 - This will reduce unnecessary fatigue.
 - Mount bulky gear and mobile support weapons in accompanying vehicles.
 - As a minimum, remove unnecessary items before beginning certain tasks.

4. Are the TTPs for vehicle and personnel searches/check points adequate?

Comments from participants and O/Cs indicate that procedures for conducting hasty and snap vehicle checkpoints (VCPs) have improved since the initial platoon level experiment, but need additional refinement.

- In general, the participants and O/Cs felt that the personnel search techniques were adequate. There was some discussion as to whether the "searcher" should be armed or not. BUST currently states that the searcher should not be armed—he is to be covered by a security man while searching an individual. This is to ensure the person being searched cannot seize the searcher's weapon. *This issue will be further evaluated.*
- In most cases, US forces will need local or host nation augmentation at VCPs, such as police, interpreters, females to search females, etc. In addition, the infantry platoon should be augmented with specialist teams to deal with some situations, particularly booby traps, improvised explosive devices (IEDs), dogs and handlers, etc.

- The minimum number of personnel needed to conduct a hasty VCP appears to be about a platoon. With this number of personnel, they can cover the needed ground; provide their own security, and process one car in 5-10 minutes.
- The consensus of the SMEs and other participants was that a fire team could safely conduct a *snap* VCP.
- Using the satelliting concept with four fire teams/elements per single security patrol, a patrol could conduct *two* snap VCPs simultaneously. This leaves a fire team available to provide area security and respond problems and other evolving situations.
- We noted that of the two different metal detectors available for use, the one that did not "beep," but vibrated (quietly) was preferred. Though the participants and SME observers agreed on the "more-silent" wand, they recommended that a larger wand that gave greater standoff and sensitivity be used.
- Participants stated that they would have liked to have some means to create a quick barrier to prevent a vehicle from departing once it is stopped. In one instance, a vehicle backed up and left a vehicle checkpoint without permission and the BLUFOR had no means of stopping or preventing its departure. MP SMEs suggested acquiring and employing a *stop sticks*. These will be evaluated during the next phase of experiments.

5. Are the TTPs for hasty house/building searches adequate?

The participants and O/Cs felt that the existing doctrinal procedures for hasty house searches are adequate. These house searches are very similar in concept to standard TTPs for cordon and search operations. During the NLR experiment, the house searches resembled clearing operations more than a house search conducted during peacekeeping operations. Therefore, more experimentation may be needed to refine the TTPs. Some areas needing improvement are:

- Need to review procedures to maintain tactical momentum once the cordons are established.
- Must ensure that any personnel and EPWs, once taken into custody, be moved out of sight so bystanders and other locals can't see or get at the activity. This reduces tension.
- Need to review the limits for general-purpose troops in conducting searches. This will produce granularity on the type, role, and need for special search teams; e.g., translators, engineers, dogs, MPs, EOD, etc.
- Must develop IA drills and SOPs for quick reaction force (QRF) reinforcement, medevacs, and other transition situations.

6. Are the TTPs for selecting, occupying, and operating out of urban patrol bases adequate?

The TTPs for this objective need additional development and evaluation. Establishing and operating from a company sized urban patrol base was a key objective of the experiment because it has become an operational reality in areas such as Bosnia and Afghanistan. This is particularly challenging when the company is operating from a base that is not co-located with the battalion.

Background.

This was our first experiment that tasked a company to establish a patrol base in a Block 2 scenario. Not surprisingly, we learned more on this objective than any of the others.

- Current site selection criteria are adequate and easy to follow.

- Kilo Company established a company patrol base at a pre-selected, city approved and coordinated site from which it would conduct its peacekeeping missions.
 - The NLR site was too small, but its location was adequate.
- Though the site was less than ideal, it met most of the requirements on the site selection checklist. It was characterized by the following:
 - Central location within assigned AO) on a two-lane road that passed by its front.
 - Fenced in compound with a fairly large steel building.
 - Potable water and electricity,
 - Head facility was augmented with portable units and serviced by host nation vender.
 - Controllable entry/exit routes.
- In the patrol base, the company established its command post (CP) to:
 - Facilitate decision making by maintaining situational awareness.
 - Facilitate the commander's ability to rapidly and accurately communicate those decisions.
 - Facilitate the commander's ability to execute through planning/COA development.

Observations.

- Marines on working parties were wearing their full kit, making it very difficult to fill sandbags and build defenses.
 - Part of this may have been because the MILES equipment was embedded into their gear and they wanted to ensure they were complying with the experiment rules.
 - It was not uncommon to see SMAW gunners and M249 gunners acting as sentries at gates and other control points. Participants noted that there was a need for additional M16s or shotguns so that Marines armed with M240G, SMAWs, SAWs, and pistols (mortar men) could be more appropriately armed to stand guard posts.
- Comments from participants concerning the arrival and initial establishment of the patrol base included:
 - Not all Marines were read in to the occupation plan relative to their specific respective job/responsibility. Too much discussion and directing had to occur once on the ground in order to facilitate the occupation which lead to a long period of vulnerability at the base.
 - The occupation and initial set-up took approximately six hours from the time the first wave arrived at the patrol base.
 - Commanders need to be very specific about the duties and priorities of work for each small unit and in some cases, individuals.
- The infantry occupied and secured the site and then brought in the engineers to sweep for booby traps and mines.

Opinions.

- Initial security patrols would have been difficult to support if they encountered trouble.
- Map and aerial photoreconnaissance should be extensive in order to locate potential vulnerabilities.
- A QRF should be designated and well rehearsed as to locations and SOPs prior to departing the assembly area.
- When not constrained by local rules, the Company should select a firm base large enough to allow for convoy / vehicles to come in maintain dispersion, and exit with some tactical dispersion.

- Use further experimentation to determine the personnel requirement to for full time manning (24/7) of a suitable sized firm base for a period longer than three days.
- Use engineers/EOD to sweep the site sooner; i.e., either just before or concurrent with occupation of positions.

Patrol Base Forces/Organization.

Although the tasks and standards for operating a company CP in MOUT are similar to non-MOUT, we saw that in order for the company to operate independent of the battalion and conduct peacekeeping operations, its CP had to be organized more like a battalion COC.

- The company will have to dedicate a portion of its forces to the continuous internal and external security of the patrol base.
- These requirements are in addition to conducting any *mission oriented* patrols, searches, or other operations.
 - At NLR, the Weapons Platoon provided the majority of the personnel for patrol base security.

Operations Tempo.

Some leaders commented that they felt that the force was beginning to reach a point of fatigue from the continuous operations, and that it might have been difficult to go much longer at the same pace than they did.

- This *feeling* is consistent with observations from previous experiments.
- Experimentation procedures may have added to the fatigue of the unit.
 - To meet the experiment goals, ProMet directed that certain platoons conduct specific missions at designated times in set areas.
 - Though this provided a greater probability that we would get the data needed for experiment output/analysis, it did not enable the company commander and his staff to establish the best operational rotation and affected the sleep plan.
- Some O/Cs and participants noted that the continuous operations were somewhat unique in their training experience and felt that it was needed to stress them and develop good procedures.
 - We intentionally did not do what we teach; namely, to use the same platoon in the same area so they could develop a familiarity with that particular area while learning the city tempo and life cycle. We know that this is the best way to be effective. By not doing this—that is we used different platoons in each area (non repetitive)—we sought to evaluate the TTPs rather than the learning curve of each discrete unit. Unfortunately, the truncated pre experiment training skewed the output.
- In the group after action review, all concerned recommended that we give mission orders to the unit commanders and let them establish the best employment schedule for their units.
 - We will do this.
- Participants also said that they thought the best way to allow platoons to become familiar with their areas and missions—while optimizing use of forces—was for the company commanders to assign platoon missions as follows:
 - One platoon conducts patrols within assigned sector.
 - One platoon provides base security and standing QRF
 - One platoon in rest cycle.
 - Spread Weapons Platoon across all patrols and base security.

Task Organization. During NLR, Kilo Company determined that the following billets needed to be established and manned as follows:

BILLET	MANNING
Commanding Officer	Company CO
S-1	Company 1 st Sgt
S-2	S-2 NCO from Battalion
S-3	Executive Officer
Fire Support Coordinator	FO/FAC
Watch Officers	Platoon Commanders / Platoon Sergeants
S-4	Company GySgt / Platoon Guides
S-5	Company Commander
S-6	Communication Marines
HQ Commandant	Weapons Platoon Commander
Guard Officer/Chief	Weapons Platoon Sergeant
Sgt of the Guard	NCO (minimum of two)
Table 2 Company COC Personnel	

Note that some of the individuals listed above were sourced from outside Kilo Company. Companies operating independently in the urban battlespace will need personnel augmentation from numerous elements of the MAGTF. Some identified during NLR were:

- *S2 Analyst.* One S2 clerk from battalion HQ was attached to Kilo Company HQ
 - The Corporal S2 analyst was responsible for briefing/debriefing patrols and rapid processing/dissemination of information gathered.
 - This individual is a key member of the staff so he needs to be experienced enough to guide the company officers and SNCOs to augment his task area.
 - For example, rapid processing of collected puzzle pieces was essential to enable the patrols to conduct snap VCPs, locate and ID specific individuals, collect and forward information to higher, and try and assess the constantly changing threat in the area.
- *Snipers.* The company was augmented with two sniper teams from the battalion Sniper Platoon.
- *Heavy Machine Gun Teams.* The company was augmented with four heavy machine gun teams employing four .50 caliber M2 heavy machine guns, mounted on four HMMWVs, from the battalion Weapons Company.
- *Combat Engineers.* The company was augmented with an engineer squad from 2nd Combat Engineer Battalion.
 - Participants (all ranks) stated that having engineers as part of the team was key to preparing the patrol base.
 - Their expertise was critical in building the bunkers and establishing the barrier plan.
- *Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) Team.* Kilo Company had a two-man EOD team attached to the infantry company.
 - These Marines were needed to assist the engineers in sweeping the selected patrol base site during initial occupation.

- They accompanied patrols to assist in identifying and handling IEDs discovered in vehicles or buildings.
- Additional thought needs to be given to determine the required numbers and needed equipment for proper EOD employment. Given the pace of operations, number of patrols and the need for EOD reps to remain at the site for security or as part of the QRF, there was some question if the two-man team provided was adequate. There was discussion on how to combine the EOD and engineers (and possibly a lesser role for the Assault men, 0351s) to cover the requirements.
- *Law Enforcement Liaison*. 4th MEB (AT) had a law enforcement liaison Gunnery Sergeant as part of the staff.
 - He provided a needed and useful link to the NLR police officers that played both a role as *host nation* law enforcement reps and as real-time experiment support.
- *Host Nation Support*. NLR police officer(s) played both the real world escort role and the host nation role when required.
- Personnel not available that would have been useful include:
 - Military Police
 - PAO
 - Political liaison

Specific Company Patrol Base Operations Areas Needing Further Development.

Participants and observers cited the following areas that need further specific development for *company patrol base operations*:

- Establish SOPs to include techniques and procedures for:
 - Passage of lines for patrols, vehicles, and convoys.
 - Local security patrolling, to include counter reconnaissance patrol.
- Compare effectiveness of four-man versus two-man roving patrols (outside the wire).
- Find effective ways to conduct screening and counter reconnaissance operations around the firm base; always assuming that the threat is watching and studying the routine(s).
- Develop an urban security patrol-debriefing format.
- Develop fire support plans and deconfliction procedures for organic and non-organic fire support assets that take in to account:
 - Company mortars vs. battalion, etc.
 - Tools for using fire support when Military geo reference system/maps are not available or adequate.
- Need to develop IA drills for:
 - Incoming sniper fire.
 - Abandoned vehicle near positions.
 - Incoming indirect fire.
 - Civil disturbances at gates.
 - Mass casualty handling.
 - Reaction force procedures—for operations inside and outside the perimeter.
- Need briefing format/procedures for watch officers to keep CO up to date.
 - For example, twice daily situation meetings (0500 and 1700 prior to Bn SITREPs).
- Must ensure that elements develop and follow a sleep plan specific to that base.
- Find a way to deal with the number of pistols in HQ element and weapons platoon.

- For example, they need to be augmented or issued other weapons (shotguns, nonlethals) if they are to be the nucleus of the firm base.
- One solution is to establish some sort of "HQ COC" weapon support box.
- Recommend that elements are initially assigned recurring activities to enhance familiarity with area and procedures; e.g., local security, QRF, peacekeeping patrols.
- Suggest integrating snipers, local security patrols around the patrol base, and RSTA assets into a security plan/security screen.
- Need better mapping production capability so that all personnel have needed maps.
 - Need a capability to update maps based on based on debriefs.

Quick Reaction Force (QRF): MOUT Issues.

The organization and employment of the QRF may need more development. NLR gave us an opportunity to evaluate the ability of a quick reaction force (QRF) to respond in a real living city. In the urban battlespace, the term *quick* is very problematic. QRFs tend to be *not so quick* and in the past have arrived too late to be effective. The QRF was deployed three times during operations in NLR. They were deployed to:

- Reinforce patrol when doing a house search.
- Assume the mission of securing a house occupied by OPFOR.
- Reinforce the raid force. In this instance, they wound up evacuating casualties.

Two of the QRF deployments were across town and were more indicative of what would be expected. Their average reaction time was:

- From call to departure—12.5 minutes.
- From departure to link-up—6.0 minutes.
- Average distance they had to travel was 17.5 blocks.

In past experiments we have seen that in pure block 3 scenarios, where the asymmetric enemy uses hit and run tactics, the QRF rarely arrived in time to make a difference. However, during the NLR block 2 scenarios, the QRF arrived in time to make a difference. The QRF was transported in a combination of vehicles, but usually they traveled in a combination of 5-ton truck escorted by two CAAT vehicles armed with .50 caliber heavy machine guns.

- The QRF was formed from some portion of the infantry platoon assigned the mission it was to support, and usually consisted of about a squad-sized element.
- The company quickly learned that the QRF commander had to attend all patrol briefs and orders, and had to sit in the COC monitoring the tactical nets while patrols were operating in the AO.
- Other lessons learned were:
 - Need a separate area where the QRF can rehearse and wait for deployment.
 - They found that if the force kept its gear on, it could deploy faster.
 - There was a need to rehearse the whole deployment cycle once the element assumes the watch.
 - Need to coordinate the link-up procedures with patrol to be supported and alert status SOPs.

Snipers.

Sniper operations seemed to work better during peacekeeping operations than during Block 3 ops. The snipers moved semi-independently, sometimes dropped off by CAAT vehicles, from the patrol to provide overwatch of vehicle checkpoints or house searches. Keys to the sniper team's effective support were:

- Preliminary coordination and understanding the mission, route, and control measures.
- Having positive comms with the patrol leader to ensure SA and position reporting.

Combined Antiarmor Team (CAAT) / Heavy Machine Gun Teams.

The heavy machine gun teams operated in HMMWVs with .50 cal M2 machine guns. They were the only mobile fire support available to make up the required *combined arms team*. Their ability to move rapidly as a maneuver element and their shock effect is important even in peacekeeping operations. Experiment output for employing the CAAT vehicles at NLR included:

- Mobile fire support assets are needed as part of the patrol task organization.
- CAAT vehicles in the patrol expand the area covered and enhance the *maneuver* capability of the patrol within that area. Some elements performed this better than others, but all greatly improved with experience. Observations were:
 - CAAT teams need a dedicated inter-team radio net.
 - CAAT radios worked better in many cases than backpacked AN/PRC-119.
 - Within the patrol, CAAT vehicles need the Intra Squad Radio (ISR) to monitor patrol communications for SA so they can provide direct, accurate and timely support.
- In many situations, the .50 cal weapon was not a good choice because of its excessive penetration in suburban areas where the buildings were light construction. In these situations, engaging enemy inside a building would have endangered noncombatants in houses in the line of fire.
 - Here the gunners suggested that they be issued M240Gs or M249s to still be able to provide mobile fire support.
- Patrol leaders and CAAT team must plan and coordinate *together* to ensure complete knowledge of the mission and its control measures. This will preclude a CAAT vehicle inadvertently driving by a target and alerting the enemy that our forces are in their area.
 - For example, during one event, the CAAT vehicle drove past the target house multiple times and made the OPFOR so nervous that they initiated contact prior to the BLUFOR being set and ready to initiate the operation.

Booby traps and IEDs. During the experiment, the company was augmented with two EOD along with the engineers from 2nd CEB. However, there was a constant and recurring need for *additional* personnel to detect, identify, and handle/dispose of booby traps and IEDs. O/C observations yielded the following information:

- Need to develop better SOPs for dealing with booby traps and IEDs.
- Need an organic capability on all patrols for detecting and possible handling.
- Noted that there is a need to warn operators about sympathetic detonation issues using ISRs and other radios around IEDs.
- Noted that due to lack of EOD/engineers, elements may have to wait for a reaction team.

7. What special C2 TTPs need to be developed to command and control units operating in the Block 2 and 3 urban environment?

Based on the discussion above, these areas are now being developed:

- Additional communication assets—radios and additional frequencies—in excess of those normally assigned to the rifle company.
- Company staffing—and the roles played by the staff—is significantly different than those normally associated with the rifle company. (See Table 2 in the previous objective.)
- Clearance of fires; i.e., higher vs. company and patrol urgency.

8. Are the TTPs for medical evacuation and resupply adequate?

Logistic and medical evacuation TTPs require further development and evaluation. Resupply received some play but was restricted because of safety requirements and non-interference issues with the city populace.

Logistics.

Logistics play during the experiment consisted of one daily resupply convoy and on call resupply sorties with company assets. These were conducted in a tactical manner when possible, but the requirements of safety and traffic patterns/schedules prevented more realistic play. Resupply missions were treated as medium-to-high risk tactical operations. Normally the Marines from the CSS element would have been BUST trained and would have been task organized, trained, and equipped to defend themselves until a QRF could reinforce them in the event of contact. In reality the CSS element was a *temp-loaned* group that studied the issues of operating in the urban environment and reviewed alternate timing of runs, routes, etc. so as not to establish patterns.

Logistics need to be played out more to better evaluate the concepts and TTPs for convoy operations, including:

- Escort procedures
- Task organization/ element composition
- C2 issues which would include *patrol-like* route plans with checkpoints, phase lines, alternate routes, etc.
- Communications procedures to ensure that they had positive comm with higher HQ from start to finish.
- Entering and leaving firm bases
- Route selection procedures to select routes and times so as to avoid rush hour problems- open (4 lane type) vs. close (narrow streets).
- Movement timing based on deception, altering pattern and city tempo
- Medical evacuation procedures when elements make contact while deep in the city conducting independent operations.
- Refueling of vehicles (HMMWVs, 5 Tons) in the firm base.
- Sanitation issues - head facilities, showers, garbage disposal, and hot ration feed plan

Medical/Handling Casualties.

Medical play during NLR experimentation was minimal. Casualties were collected during the four patrols and the raid mission and transported to the company base. This objective will be evaluated in detail during the battalion level experiment in August 2002.

Experiment Results: Communications

Most participants stated communications were critical to the successful use of the satellite patrol technique. They added ISRs were the greatest enabler of maneuver and control.

Participants and SMEs noted the following issues that relate to communications in particular.

- RTOs in the firm base should *not* approve elements' actions without Watch Officer's knowledge/permission.
- The company must have a comprehensive communications plan that includes perimeter security posts, antenna locations, maintenance plan, security patrols, etc.
- Use wire as primary communications for internal security and operations.
- Push ISRs down to the individual Marine level in order to SA to improve command, control, maneuver, response to immediate threats, etc.
- Squads and platoons all operated all on one ISR channel—causing problems.
- Include communications questions in the intelligence debrief, to map the city concerning its communications characteristics.
 - To chart city to identify good and bad areas for communications.
- Units will need communication equipment augmentation, particularly to support maintenance and redundancy.
 - Along with the increase in radio assets, the infantry has a continuing need to provide communications training for personnel.
- Units need to pay more attention to antenna location and avoid selecting sites that may experience interference from electric wires and masking.
 - Use a retransmission capability if necessary.
 - Elevate antennas as necessary for better operation.
- Although units may be able to use local power-to-power or recharge batteries, they may lose power and will need both disposable batteries and auxiliary power sources (generator, vehicle power recharger).
- CAAT (vehicle mounted) communications seemed most reliable relative to others used throughout city.
- Use vehicle radios, which have a greater power output, if having problems with communications.

It was noted by O/C SME that while in the patrol base, preventive maintenance (PM) of vehicles, weapons, communications assets, and other equipment would still be necessary. This was true for the communications equipment, which caused problems as they did not have adequate replacements and had to shut down nets to conduct PMs.

AN/PRC-148 MBITR, Personal Role Radio, and ICOM (ISR) Radio and Headset Feedback.

- 1. Quality of Training.** Rate the training you received on the use of the radio.

Table 3 Quality of Training					
User ID	Poor 1	Ave 2	Ex 3	O/S 4	Ways to Improve Training
Patrol Leader MBITR				2	More in-depth training
Team Leader MBITR PRR	1	4	3		Some Marines were not present during training
			6	3	
Marine PRR	1	4	10	2	
Patrol Leader MBITR		3			More hands on training
Team Leader MBITR ICOM		3			More detailed class on functions
	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	No ICOM training given
Marine ICOM	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	No ICOM training given
Total: MBITR=2.4 PRR=2.9 ICOM=N/A	1/16	10/16	3/16	2/16	
	1/26	4/26	16/26	5/26	
	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	

Remarks:

- a. The amount of training conducted on the MBITR was insufficient.
- b. Marines were able to operate the radio in a tactical environment but had difficulty troubleshooting it.
- c. The quality and amount of training conducted on the PRR was sufficient for the Marines to successfully employ it in a tactical environment.

2. Ease of Use. Overall, how easy was the radio to use?

Table 4 Ease of Use					
User ID	N/A	Very Difficult 1	Difficult 2	Easy 3	Very Easy 4
Patrol Leader MBITR			2	3	
Team Leader MBITR			1	7	3
PRR					9
Marine PRR				4	13
Patrol Leader MBITR			1	1	
Team Ldr MBITR ICOM			1	2	
			2	4	1
Marine ICOM				3	5

Table 4 Ease of Use					
User ID	N/A	Very Difficult 1	Difficult 2	Easy 3	Very Easy 4
Total: MBITR=3.0 PRR=3.0 ICOM=3.2			5/21	13/21	3/21
				4/26	22/26
			2/15	7/15	6/15

Remarks:

- a. Marines found the MBITR easy to operate when it was pre-loaded with frequencies, keymat, and hopssets/loadsets.
- b. Additional training is required to enable the users to properly configure the MBITR.
- c. Marines found the PRR and ICOM easy to use.

3. Ease of Changing Frequency. How easy was it to change frequencies?

Table 5 Ease of Changing Frequencies					
User ID	N/A	Very Difficult 1	Difficult 2	Easy 3	Very Easy 4
Patrol Leader MBITR					2
Team Leader MBITR PRR		2		3	4
				1	8
Marine PRR				4	13
Patrol Leader MBITR		1	1		
Team Ldr MBITR ICOM				2	1
			3	3	
Marine ICOM			3	4	2
Total: MBITR=3.0 PRR=3.8 ICOM=2.7		3/16	1/16	5/16	7/16
				5/26	21/26
			6/15	7/15	2/15

Remarks:

- a. Marines found it easy to change frequencies on the MBITR.
- b. Some of Marines suggested the creation of a remote device that would allow them to change frequencies while the radio was still on their back.
- c. Marines found it very easy to change the frequencies on the PRR.
- d. Marines found it somewhat difficult to change frequencies on the ICOM with their gloves on.

4. Difficulty in Using Two Radios. How difficult was it to use two radios?

Table 6 Difficulty In Using Two Radios					
User ID	N/A	Very Difficult 1	Difficult 2	Easy 3	Very Easy 4
Patrol Leader MBITR				1	1
Team Leader MBITR				6	2
PRR				4	6
Marine PRR					
Patrol Leader MBITR		1	1		
Team Ldr MBITR		1	2		
ICOM		4	2	1	
Marine ICOM					
Total:		2/15	3/15	7/15	3/15
MBITR=2.7				4/10	6/10
PRR=3.6					
ICOM=1.5		4/7	2/7	1/7	

Remarks

- a. Marines found it very easy to use two radios with the PRR/MBITR single headset two-radio combination.
 - b. They found it difficult to use two radios with the ICOM/MBITR multi-headset two-radio combination.
 - c. The use of two headsets with separate push-to-talk devices while wearing a Kevlar helmet was very uncomfortable and difficult to employ.
5. **Average number of transmissions per hour.** On average, how many times per hour did you transmit traffic on the radio?

Table 7 Transmissions Per Hour					
User ID	1-10 1	11-20 2	21-30 3	41-50 4	51-60 5
Patrol Leader MBITR				1	1
Team Leader MBITR	2	1	4		2
PRR		2	3	2	2
Marine PRR	9	3	4		1
Patrol Leader MBITR		1			1
Team Ldr MBITR			1		2
ICOM		3		4	
Marine ICOM	6	2			
Total	2/16	2/16	5/16	1/16	6/16
MBITR=3.4					
PRR=2.4	9/26	5/26	7/26	2/26	3/26
ICOM=2.1	6/15	5/15		4/15	

Remarks:

- a. There were more transmissions made at the Platoon Commander/Squad Leader level than at the Squad Leader/Fire Team Leader level.
6. **Average number of receptions per hour.** On average, how many times per hour did you receive traffic on the radio?

Table 8 Receptions Per Hour						
User ID	1-10 1	11-20 2	21-30 3	31-40 4	41-50 5	51-60 6
Patrol Leader MBITR					2	
Team Leader MBITR		1	6	1		1
PRR		2	2	1	1	3
Marine PRR	6	2	4	3		1
Patrol Leader MBITR		1				1
Team Ldr MBITR		1				2
ICOM	1	2		2	2	
Marine ICOM	1	2	5			
Total:		1/11	6/11	1/11	2/11	1/11
MBITR=3.6						
PRR=2.8	6/25	4/25	6/25	4/25	1/25	3/25
ICOM=2.8	2/15	4/15	5/15	2/15	2/15	

Remarks:

- a. There were more receptions received at the Platoon Commander/Squad Leader level than at the Squad Leader/Fire Team Leader level.
7. **Average Transmission Time (Length of Transmission).** What was your average transmission time?

Table 9 Average Transmission Time (seconds)					
User ID	1-10 1	11-20 2	21-30 3	31-40 4	41-50 5
Patrol Leader MBITR	1	1			
Team Leader MBITR	6	3			
PRR	5	3			1
Marine PRR	15	1			
Patrol Leader MBITR		2			
Team Ldr MBITR	3				
ICOM	3	2	2		
Marine ICOM	5	3			

Table 9 Average Transmission Time (seconds)					
User ID	1-10 1	11-20 2	21-30 3	31-40 4	41-50 5
Total: MBITR=1.4 PRR=1.2 ICOM=1.6	10/17	6/17			1/17
	20/24	4/24			
	8/15	5/15	2/15		

Remarks:

- a. The transmission duration was longer at the fire team levels than at the Platoon Commander/Squad Leader level.

8. Average Length of Incoming Messages (Reception Time). What was your average reception time?

Table 10 Length of Incoming Messages (seconds)					
User ID	1-10	11-20	21-30	41-50	51-60
Patrol Leader MBITR	1	1			
Team Leader MBITR PRR	6	3			
	6	2			
Marine PRR	15	1			
Patrol Leader MBITR		1			
Team Ldr MBITR ICOM	4				
	4	1			
Marine ICOM	7	3			
Total: MBITR=1.3 PRR=1.1 ICOM=1.2	11/16	5/16			
	21/24	3/24			
	11/15	4/15			

Remarks:

- a. The reception duration was longer at the at the Platoon Commander/Squad Leader level than at the Fire Team Leader level.

9. Frequency of type of Message^{3/4} most frequent (1) to least frequent (4). What type of message did you send most, (1 being the MOST FREQUENT, 2 being the second most, etc.)?

Table 11 Frequency of Type of Message																
User ID	POSREP				SITREP				Contact				CASREP			
	1	2	3	4	1	2	3	4	1	2	3	4	1	2	3	4
Patrol Leader MBITR	2					2					1				1	
Tm Ldr MBITR PRR	5	2			2	4					4	1			1	2
	5					4					4					4
Marine PRR	5	6			5	6					5					4
Patrol Leader MBITR	2					2					3					2
Tm Ldr MBITR ICOM	2	1			1	2					3					3
	7					7					7					7
Marine ICOM	4	2	2		3	5			1	1	4					6
Total: MBITR	11/46	3/46			3/46	10/46					10/46				2/46	9/46
PRR	10/48	6/48			5/48	10/48					9/48					8/48
ICOM	11/56	2/56	2/56		3/56	12/56			1/56	1/56	11/56					13/56

Remarks:

- a. The position report and the situation report were the most frequent types of messages sent. There were no Call for Fire messages.

10. Battery Reliability. Did you change the batteries on the radio?

11. Battery Endurance. On average, how long did the batteries last?

Table 12 Battery Reliability and Endurance					
User ID	Change Batteries		Battery Life		
	Yes 1	No 2	3-4 Hours 1	5-6 Hours 2	More 3
Patrol Leader MBITR	2			1	1
Team Leader MBITR PRR	9		3	5	1
	4	7			10
Marine PRR	7	10			17
Patrol Leader MBITR	2		2		
Team Ldr MBITR ICOM	2	1	2		1
	2	6			8
Marine ICOM	2	6			8
Total: Change Battery	15/16	1/16	7/16	6/16	3/16

Table 12 Battery Reliability and Endurance						
Battery Life		Change Batteries		Battery Life		
		11/28	17/28			28/28
MBITR=1.0	3.0					
PRR= 1.6	3.0	4/16	12/16			16/16
ICOM= 1.7	3.0					

Remarks:

- a. The batteries for the MBITR had to be changed by almost all of the Marines who used them due to the average life cycle of five hours.
- b. The batteries that were used during this experiment were over a year old and were not properly re-charged in some cases.
- c. The batteries for the PRR and ICOM did not have to be changed in most cases and lasted for an average of 48 hours.

12. Mission Effectiveness. Did the radio allow you to perform your mission more effectively?

Table 13 Mission Effectiveness						
User ID	Same 1	Better 2	Some-what Better 3	Better 4	Much Better 5	Remarks
Patrol Leader MBITR					2	It was great to have secure comm with the Plt Cdr and Sqd Ldrs, increased SA at longer ranges than the ICOM improved mission effectiveness
Team Leader MBITR			1	4	4	Great to have secure comm. with other team ldrs and the company tac when needed.
PRR					9	Greatly enhanced mission effectiveness. Easy to use.
Marine PRR	1		1	3	12	Enhanced mission effectiveness but need longer range.
Patrol Leader MBITR	1		1			It did when it worked. The radios did not keep the 1-5 second timing interval very well in the SINCGARS mode. They worked great in the single channel mode.
Team Ldr MBITR	3					When the MBITRs went down we had to switch to ICOMs
ICOM	1		6			Enhanced mission effectiveness during movement but ineffective during contact. Too many users on one channel during contact.
Marine ICOM	1	2		1	4	Increased SA, had difficulty communicating during contact.
Total: MBITR=3.5	4/16		2/16	4/16	6/16	

Table 13 Mission Effectiveness						
User ID	Same 1	Better 2	Some-what Better 3	Better 4	Much Better 5	Remarks
PRR=4.6 ICOM=3.2	1/26		1/26	3/26	21/26	
	2/15	2/15	6/15	1/15	4/15	

Remarks:

- a. Marines found that the MBITR increased mission effectiveness only somewhat better.
 - (1) The combination of a problem with an older software version and lack of adequate training resulted in an inefficient use of the MBITR.
 - (2) The timing of the radio did not stay within the 1-5 second tolerance range when used in the frequency-hopping mode, thus causing major communications breakdowns.
- b. The PRR was found to substantially increase mission effectiveness at the lowest levels.
 - (1) It was easy to operate and integrate with legacy radios.
- c. The ICOM radio was easy to use but was very difficult to integrate with legacy radios.

13. Problems. Did you experience any problems with the radio?

Table 14 General Problems			
User ID	Yes 1	No 2	Remarks
Patrol Leader MBITR	1	1	The MBITRs did not hold timing in the SINCGARS mode. This created problems for the entire patrol when one of the radios went down.
Team Leader MBITR PRR	6	3	Only problems in the SINCGARS mode. Once we went SC they worked fine. The batteries only lasted about four hours.
	5	4	No problems with the radio, could use longer range. The earpiece was too thick when worn under the Kevlar helmet.
Marine PRR	6	11	The headset was uncomfortable when worn for long periods of time with the Kevlar helmet.
Patrol Leader MBITR	2		Worked fine when we went to SC mode but had many problems in the SINCGARS mode.
Team Ldr MBITR ICOM	2	1	Too difficult to use at the squad level with the amount of training received.
	5	2	Worked great during movement but had trouble getting through during contact.
Marine ICOM	3	5	Too many users on one net at a time.
Total: MBITR=1.3 PRR=1.6 ICOM=1.5	11/16 5/16		
	11/26 15/26		
	8/15 7/15		

Remarks:

- a. The main problem the Marines had with the MBITR was a timing problem when operated in the SINCGARS mode.

- (1) The MBITRs that were used in the NLR Experiment were not initially configured for operation in the SINCGARS mode.
 - (2) The MBITRs were enabled to operate in the SINCGARS mode through the application of a software patch by MCWL C4.
 - (3) This patch initially worked but the MBITRs had difficulty keeping the 1-5 second timing interval required for frequency hopping.
 - (4) This timing issue with the radios created problems for the entire patrol when one of the radios went down.
 - (5) All of the MBITRs that MCWL now owns have been upgraded and work properly in the SINCGARS mode.
- b. The only complaints with the PRR were not long enough range and the headset needed to be a bit thinner when worn with the Kevlar helmet.
 - c. Marines had difficulty communicating over the ICOM radio during contact due to too many users on the net.

14. Radio Ruggedness. Was the radio rugged enough to support your mission? **Yes / No**

Table 15 Ruggedness			
User ID	Yes 1	No 2	Remarks
Patrol Leader MBITR	2		
Team Leader MBITR	9		
PRR	9		
Marine PRR	17		
Patrol Leader MBITR	2		
Team Ldr MBITR	2	1	
ICOM	3	4	Does not work after it gets wet.
Marine ICOM	7	1	This radio is not rugged enough for use in poor weather conditions.
Total:	15/16	1/16	
MBITR=1.0			
PRR=1.0	26/26		
ICOM=1.3	10/15	5/15	

Remarks:

- a. The ICOM was the only radio that was not rugged enough to support the mission.

15. Radio Carry Position. Where on your body did you carry the radio?

Table 16 Carry Location					
User ID	Waist 1	Shoulder 2	Back (Camel Bak) 3	Other 4	Preference

User ID	Waist 1	Shoulder 2	Back (Camel Bak) 3	Other 4	Preference
Patrol Leader MBITR	1			2 Back of flack jacket	Back of flack
Team Leader MBITR	1	1	4	1 Butt pack	Camelbak
PRR		6		3 Chest	Shoulder
Marine PRR	1	14		3 Chest	Shoulder
Patrol Leader MBITR			3		Camel bak
Team Ldr MBITR			1	1 Chest	Chest
ICOM	1			6 Chest	Chest
Marine ICOM	1	4		3 Chest	Shoulder
Total: MBITR=2.9 PRR=2.3 ICOM=3.0	2/15	1/15	8/15	4/15	On back
	1/26	20/26		5/26	On shoulder
	2/15	4/15		9/15	On chest

Remarks:

- a. The majority of the Marines carried the MBITR in the Camelbak.
- b. The PRR was worn on the shoulder.
- c. The ICOM was worn on the chest.

16. Radio, Headset and Push-To-Talk Button Interference With Use Of Weapon. Did the radio, headset, or push to talk button cause you any problems in using your assigned weapon?

User ID	Radio		Headset		Push-to Talk		Remarks
	1	2	1	2	1	2	
	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	
Patrol Leader MBITR		2		2		2	Headset earpiece too thick when worn under kevlar
Team Leader MBITR		8	2	6		8	
PRR		9	3	6	1	8	Like the wireless PTT very much
Marine PRR		17	4	13	2	15	Wireless PTT cannot be hooked on the M203.

Table 17 Interference With Use Of Weapon							
User ID	Radio		Headset		Push-to Talk		Remarks
	1	2	1	2	1	2	
	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	
Patrol Leader MBITR		2	1	1	2		Headset wires got caught on gear and the PTT would key while in the prone position.
Team Ldr MBITR	7	2	5	4	4	5	Need a better location to place the MBITR. Need to be able to reach the channel selector while not getting the radio in the way of the weapon or gear.
ICOM	5	8	2	6	1	7	
Marine ICOM		8	2	5	1	6	Hot mic problems with PTT
Total:	Radio	Headset	PTT				
MBITR=	1.6	1.6	1.7				
PRR=	2.0	1.7	1.9				
ICOM=	1.8	1.6	1.9				
	7/21	14/21	8/21	13/21	6/21	15/21	
		26/26	7/26	19/26	3/26	23/26	
	5/21	16/21	7/21	14/21	2/21	19/21	

Remarks:

- a. The PRR headset earpiece was too thick when worn under Kevlar helmet.
- b. The Marines liked the wireless PTT that came with the PRR very much.
- c. The only problem with the wireless PTT is that it cannot be hooked on the M203.
- d. The Thales headset wires got caught on gear and the PTT would key while in the prone position.
- e. The Marines want a better location to place the MBITR.
 - (1) They need to be able to reach the channel selector while not getting the radio in the way of the weapon or gear.

17. Use of Headset. Did you use a headset with the radio? **Yes / No**

Table 18 Headset Use						
User ID	Hard Headset	Head Band	None	Problems		Remarks
				Yes	No	
Patrol Leader MBITR		2		1	1	Earpiece too thick
Team Leader MBITR/PRR	1	17		7	11	Earpiece too thick
Marine PRR		17		4	13	Uncomfortable with Kevlar helmet
Patrol Leader MBITR		3		2	1	Headband would slip when used with Kevlar helmet.

Table 18 Headset Use						
User ID	Hard Headset	Head Band	None	Problems		Remarks
				Yes	No	
Team Ldr MBITR		2		2		
	5	2		4	3	Need to be able to rotate the earpiece better.
ICOM						
Marine ICOM	8			6	2	Hard headset very uncomfortable when worn with Kevlar helmet.
Total:						
MBITR	1/25	24/25		10/25	15/25	
PRR		33/33		11/33	22/33	
ICOM	13/15	2/15		10/15	5/15	

Remarks:

- a. All Marines used some sort of headset with the radios.
- b. The headset of preference was the PRR style with the exception of being a bit snug under the Kevlar helmet.
 - (1) The company has already said that they can make the earpiece thinner for use with the U.S. Kevlar helmet.

18. Headset Comfort. How comfortable was the headset?

Table 19 Headset Comfort				
User ID	Un-Comfortable 1	OK 2	Comfortable 3	Very Comfortable 4
Patrol Leader MBITR			2	
Team Leader MBITR/PRR	6	5	6	1
Marine PRR	5	8	3	1
Patrol Leader MBITR		1	1	
Team Ldr MBITR	6	5	1	
ICOM				
Marine ICOM	4	2	2	
Total:				
MBITR=2.2	6/22	6/22	9/22	1/22
PRR=2.0	11/35	13/35	9/35	2/35
ICOM=1.7	4/8	2/8	2/8	

Remarks:

- a. The Thales hard plastic headset was the most uncomfortable when worn under the Kevlar helmet.

19. What recommendations do you have to improve the radio?

Table 20 Ways to Improve the Radio	
User ID	Remarks
Patrol Leader MBITR	Make it easier to operate. Fix the timing problem in SINCGARS mode.
Team Leader MBITR	Figure out a better way to carry it on body so you can have access to the channel selector.
PRR	Increase the range
Marine PRR	
Patrol Leader MBITR	Increase the battery life.
Team Ldr MBITR ICOM	
Marine ICOM	

20. What recommendations do you have to improve the headset?

Table 21 Ways to Improve the Head Set	
User ID	Remarks
Patrol Leader MBITR	
Team Leader MBITR/PRR	Make the earpiece thinner.
Marine PRR	
Patrol Leader MBITR	
Team Ldr MBITR ICOM	Make an over the head strap for the headband to prevent slipping.
Marine ICOM	The earpiece needs to be able to rotate closer to the ear.

21. Do you feel that this capability should be provided to every infantry rifle platoon?

Table 22 Should Every Rifle Platoon Have this Capability			
User ID	Yes 1	No 2	Remarks
Patrol Leader MBITR	2		Team Ldr and higher should have an MBITR
Team Leader MBITR PRR	9		
	9		Every man should have a PRR
Marine PRR	16	1	Keep it simple, greater range
Patrol Leader MBITR	2	1	MBITR is too complicated for the squad level
Team Ldr MBITR ICOM	3		
	6	1	Too much traffic on the net
Marine ICOM	7	1	Too many users on one channel
Total:	16/17	1/17	
MBITR=1.0	24/25	1/25	

Table 22 Should Every Rifle Platoon Have this Capability			
User ID	Yes 1	No 2	Remarks
PRR=1.0 ICOM=1.1	13/15	2/15	

Experiment Results: Training Objectives

1. **What topics should the training package include to prepare individuals, teams, and units to conduct combined arms offensive and defensive combat operations in the urban environment?** (This is oriented towards determining what individual, team, and unit *introductory* training is required.)
 - a. Three participants recommended that the course should include more info on employing CATT elements in the urban environment.
 - b. Two classes were recommended for deletion—the class on Engineers and the class on the Historical Examples. No reasons were provided.
 - c. Table 2 summarizes student responses when asked to rate the course material overall:

	O/S	Excellent	Above Average	Average	Below Average	Total Responses
Capt/Lt		2				2
SNCO	1					1
Sgt/Cpl	3	4	3		1	11
LCpl	4	4	4	1		13
PFC/Pvt	1	3				4
Total	9	13	7	1	1	31
% of Total	29%	42%	23%	3%	3%	100%

Table 23 Overall Course Rating

- d. Summary of pertinent Course Critique comments are:
 - i. Nothing to compare it to.
 - ii. Good knowledge to gain—but it was rushed."
 - iii. Some classes boring and hard to follow—PA is better."
2. **What instructional methods should be used for individual, team, and unit introductory training to prepare Marines to conduct combined arms offensive and defensive combat operations in the urban environment?**
 - a. In most cases, students want more practical application and fewer lectures during the BUST package.
 - b. Many participants stated that they got more out of *training* in NLR than in the MOUT site.
 - c. We clearly saw and understood that in many instances you could not employ many of the weapons because of the danger they would present to the noncombatants in the city. On the other hand, we did not feel comfortable employing some weapons simulators for fear of endangering the local populace.
 - i. For example, they could be lost or present a fragmentation hazard (blue body grenades, booby trap simulators, simunitions, etc.).
 - ii. Smoke and trip flares could also create real or perceived problems for noncombatants during use.

- d. Participants stated that they had to adjust more when operating in this real urban environment as compared to the military MOUT sites. Particularly, time space relationships become more apparent in moving through a populated city; e.g., traffic patterns, city tempo, types of terrain.
- e. There were lots of realistic distractions—sound, lights, people, vehicles, dogs, cats, etc. that created many challenges to the operating forces.
- f. The terrain is more realistic than MOUT sites—size, fences, and size/complexity of buildings. And, one aspect that is both positive and negative is that you cannot control what is going on around you—people, places, and things, electricity, straphangers, etc.
- g. Because of restrictions, we could not employ air or heavy mech assets. Therefore, the "combined arms team" was limited to infantry, engineers, EOD, CSS, HMMWVs, and 5-Ton Trucks (5Ts).
- h. The use of civilian role players seemed to work well. Because of the small numbers required, we relied upon volunteers from the local Marine Corps League and the city staff.
- i. Having a uniformed police officer with each patrol and additional police for roadblocks when needed worked well and there were no problems noted.
- j. There were some problems with media control due to the open nature of the environment, but when requested to adjust their position, they did. The use of escorts and rendezvous points mitigated the problems in most cases.
- k. Having a city with a military support capability significantly reduced costs for billeting, vehicle TOT, fuel, subsistence, and other support functions.

3. What TTPs should be included for platoon and company sized combined arms team to conduct offensive, defensive, and security operations in the urban environment?

- a. Based on the comments from Kilo company students and others from previous training sessions, ProMet feels that the Block 3 TTPs taught in the BUST package are adequate.
 - i. ProMet will continue to evaluate and revise these TTPs as data indicates is necessary.
- b. Additional development and refinement is needed in the following Block 3 TTPs:
 - i. CAS and assault support (not evaluated in NLR).
 - ii. Reconnaissance operations.
- c. Block 2 TTPs need continued development and revision, particularly for:
 - i. Battalion level operations (not evaluated in NLR).
 - ii. Combined arms operations with tanks, AAVs, LAVs (not evaluated in NLR).
 - iii. Dealing with IEDs/booby traps (not evaluated in NLR).
 - iv. Battalion/company level patrol base ops, QRF employment, resupply, convoy ops, medical evacuation.
 - v. Satelliting techniques with armor and mech assets (not evaluated in NLR).
 - 1. Only had HMMWVs and 5-ton trucks in NLR.
- d. Need to continue to the battalion/MEU level and integrate the other mech assets into the Block II training package. Will be evaluated in the next battalion level phase.

4. How much training time does a platoon or company sized combined arms team need to develop adequate “proficiency” to conduct combined arms operations in the urban environment?

- a. We continue to believe that it will take approximately three (3) weeks of basic individual and initial collective training at the squad and platoon level to develop familiarization with the TTPs and an additional week of intensive training to begin to develop unit proficiency.
- b. Kilo company received 13 days training at the Camp Lejeune MOUT site on BUST including block II and III TTPs, during mid January.
- c. There was a break between BUST and next refam and introductory training on basics in Lejeune until the 16 January.
 - i. This was the only collective training with 78 new Marines joined from SOI.
- d. Saw a great deal of improvement after each element’s first patrol in NLR, even though this was a very new environment and they had a lot of new personnel.
- e. The following table shows the student responses when asked how many days the BUST course should be:

DAYS	5	6	10	14	15	18	20	21	30	TOTAL
Number	1	1	4	4	3	2	2	7	1	25
%	4%	4%	16%	16%	12%	8%	8%	28%	4%	100

Table 24 Training Days Needed

5. How much sustainment training, and on what topics, is required for a platoon or company sized combined arms team to maintain its "proficiency" level to conduct combined arms operations in the urban environment?

- a. Not addressed during 4th MEB training and NLR experimentation.


6. What facilities are required to properly train individuals, teams, and units?

- a. 4th MEB (AT) elements received BUST training at Camp Lejeune MOUT facility.
- b. There were many participants who stated that the Camp Lejeune MOUT facility is marginally adequate training facility for basic urban training. They stated it was too small to conduct urban foot patrols particularly at the platoon level. That the environment is too sterile and has no distractions - noise, traffic, non-combatants, etc.
- c. Many participants stated that NLR provided the best training environment.



Section II: Detailed Descriptions of Experiment EventsError! Bookmark not defined.
Error! Bookmark not defined.

Event One



First patrol of experiment. No OPFOR or role players participated. Lack of preparation time was a major issue. Patrol was “kicked out” early while the company was busy trying to establish the patrol base. The southernmost portion of the route was very canalizing and affected the progress of the patrol. At one point the PL lost SA w/ CAAT and one team. The PL went firm regaining control and SA of subordinate elements. Pace of patrol was too fast, running bounds of 100 yds or greater. Fast pace attributed to nervousness and training in smaller MOUT sites where the entire facility may only be 200 meters wide. There was good comm between the two CAAT vehicles; little between the ground elements. The CAAT vehicles need ISRs to monitor and maintain SA of adjacent ground elements as well as for use by their own vehicle security Marines.

Event One Feedback Summary.

OPFOR: none

Role players: none

Overall Comments:

- Took patrol 1 hour and 15 minutes to cover 27 blocks on foot.
- Lack of proper preparation time, major issue.
- Lost SA of CAAT and one team, went firm, regained control.
- Canalizing effect of terrain - planning vs. reality.
- Good communication between vehicles—little between ground troops, CAAT needs ISRs.
- Need security element with CAAT

1. **How many casualties/POWs did your element have and/or inflict? N/A**
2. **Did you conduct a Casualty Evacuation (CASEVAC) for these casualties? N/A**
3. **In your opinion, did your element accomplish its mission?**

BILLET	YES	NO	N/A	REMARKS
Platoon Leader			X	
Platoon Sgt	X			
Team Leader	X			
Team Leader	X			
Team Leader	X			
CAAT Leader	X			
CAAT Leader	X			

GENERAL QUESTIONS FOR ENTIRE UNIT (COMPLETE FOR PATROLLING AND ANY OTHER TASK COMPLETED DURING EXPERIMENT)

4. What helped most during patrolling?

PL – ICOMs (ISR)

Team Leader - communication

Team Leader - comm worked well, it was useful when visual comm was lost

Team Leader—bounding, CAAT patrol, comm and keeping eyes on each other

CAAT Leader—comm between the two vehicles...comm with foot element was not there.

CAAT Leader—comm between the two humvees, being able to know where the other was.

5. What did not work well during patrolling?

PL - satelliting was difficult due to canalizing effect of buildings and fences.

Team Leader - satelliting can be difficult or near impossible in some areas. Maneuvering around fenced off axis as it was taught at BUST. Movement in city is more restricted. (not sure this LCPL Team Leader went through BUST).

Team Leader - well I guess we didn't have to run so much.

CAAT Leader—comm with the foot element, had to guess where the patrol was going, would have slowed reaction time if patrol needed support.

CAAT Leader—comm with the squad or patrol, did not always know where they were

6. In your opinion, how well trained was your element to conduct this mission?

BILLET	N/A	POOR	AVG	A/A	EX	O/S	REMARKS
Platoon Leader	X						
Platoon Sgt			X				
Team Leader		X					No BUST
Team Leader						X	
Team Leader					X		
CAAT Leader			X				
CAAT Leader			X				

7. What specific training best prepared your element during this event?

All answered BUST and practical Application at MOUT facility

8. What training does your group think was needed but did not receive for this mission?

PL - not all the Marines had BUST.

CAAT Leaders (2) need ICOM training.

9. List three (3) things your unit learned during this event that would help Marines in the future:

1. More time to prepare.
2. More comm training; e.g., force comm between mounted and dismounted.
3. Knowing boundaries of where cover can be found or what things we can get cover behind, more 411 (information) needed.

10. Was any of your unit's equipment or vehicles damaged or destroyed, including attachments to your unit? List type of equipment, how damage was inflicted and location. N/A

11. What other organizational or equipment changes does your group recommend to make the element more effective than it was?

Prefer ISR to MBITR.

12. Use the remaining space to make any other comments you have about THIS PARTICULAR event: (use back of form if needed).

Team Leader - It just felt like we didn't have enough time to find out what exactly we were doing.... need to slow down and run only if needed.

KEY LEADER'S QUESTIONNAIRE: TO BE COMPLETED BY PLATOON COMMANDER, PLT SGT, SQD LDR'S, FIRE TEAM LDR'S, AND ATTACHMENT CMDR'S

PK/PE PATROLLING

13. Did you think the satelliting technique taught was effective? (Y/N) Explain your answer.

Y PL— when we could it was effective.

Y Team Leader (3)—classes taught were very broken down in simplistic manner so everyone understood the techniques. At times it was effective and at times it was not... terrain dictates.

Y Team Leader - it works good for all around security.

Y CAAT Leader—confuses the enemy also keeps enemy from closing in on patrol.

Y CAAT Leader—keeps enemy off guard, never knowing what is going on.

14. Did you think the task organization of your unit was effective? (Y/N) Explain your answer. Y/N

Y - CAAT Team Leader - still need to take the time to work out security and comm issues.

N- PL couldn't establish specific tasks because of lack of (prep) time.

N- We weren't given to much info on what we were doing, all we got was the route, but the unit was still well organized.

15. Did your task organization allow you the flexibility to transition from “block II” to “block III” intensity? Y/N

Y - Team Leader - Yes it did because we were never spread out to much

Y - Team Leader

Y - CAAT Team Leader but I still think a security attachment was needed

Y - CAAT Team Leader

N- PL

16. Was command and control of your element easier or more difficult? Y/N

Y - PL- easier due to everyone having ICOMs

Y Team Leader - it was easier because no one wanted to get lost so my unit tried to keep eye contact with each other at all time

Y - Team Leader - it was easy to control teams with the ICOMs

Y - Team Leader - because I kept eyes on and had comm plus maps

N - CAAT Team Leader - more difficult, lack of visual with other friendly forces made to rely on comm more

N - CAAT Team Leader - was harder because you don't train so much for urban terrain, you don't have as much visual on everything, where as you would in the sticks or dessert

17. What aspects of the satelliting or patrolling technique did not work well?

PL- canalized in some areas

Team Leader - the units can easily be canalized if movement through certain areas is prohibited


CAAT Team Leader - It works well when comm procedures are done properly, but can be dangerous when comm is lacking

18. How can the technique be improved?

PL- practice

Team Leader - the pace of the patrol can be slowed, bring maneuvering elements closer n
to the HQ element
CAAT Team Leader - practice comm procedures.

Event Two



Patrol T/O:

Platoon split in half. Platoon commander executed VCP while Plt Sgt remained at Company patrol base with reaction force.

HQ 8 (Includes 2 EOD)

TM 4

TM 4

CAAT 4 (HMG Variant)

CAAT 4 (HMG Variant)

Planning and conduct of proper rehearsals was a problem. No fire support or tactical control measures were planned/briefed. EOD SOPs were not briefed during the mission order. The EOD attachments had no NVGs. During execution of the HVCP, there was difficulty in establishing the planned barrier plan. The security perimeter needed to be expanded; failure to recognize attributed to training in smaller MOUT sites. Entire patrol/HVCP element size could have been increased. Good interview procedures were observed. However, the element failed to have the driver search the vehicle, and was too timid in searching females. Weapons were employed incorrectly, using the M249 to cover searches.

Event Two Feedback Summary

Unit: 3rd Platoon **Mission:** Night Security patrol/hasty VCP

Total BLUFOR in box: 1/25/1

OPFOR: none

Role players: vehicles for searching

Overall Comments:

- Patrol route covered 1 hour and 14 minutes to cover a total 23 blocks of foot movement, to and from VCP and patrol base
- VCP took 1 hour and 46 minutes from start to finish
- No FS plan or tactical control measures planned/briefed
- EOD SOPs not briefed during mission order, no weapons or NVGs
- Difficulty in establishing barrier plan
- Some initial confusion on roles and duties
- Found weapons in trunk, followed rules
- Needed to expand security perimeter, MOUT site syndrome
- Element size could have been larger
- Did not have driver search vehicle
- Used good interview procedures each time
- Too timid searching females
- Used a M249 to cover searches...may need to switch weapons around.

1. **How many casualties/POWs did your element have and/or inflict? None.**
2. **Did you conduct a Casualty Evacuation (CASEVAC) for these casualties? N/A.**
3. **In your opinion, did your element accomplish its mission? (Y/N)**
 - Y - Platoon Commander -
 - Y - Team Leader -
 - Y - Team Leader
 - Y - Team Leader
 - Y - CAAT Team Leader

GENERAL QUESTIONS FOR ENTIRE UNIT (COMPLETE FOR PATROLLING AND ANY OTHER TASK COMPLETED DURING EXPERIMENT)

4. What helped most during patrolling?

Platoon Commander - the satellite patrolling worked great and the comm gear magnified that.

Team Leader - communication of other team.

Team Leader - doing satellite patrolling is good - keeps enemy on their toes and gives all around security.

Team Leader – ICOMs.

CAAT Team Leader - radio contact so we knew where each vehicle was.

5. What helped most when conducting personnel searches?

Team Leader - security on personnel plus personnel weren't angry (were compliant).

6. What helped most when conducting vehicle searches?

Team Leader - communication with in search team.

Team Leader - having a searcher and a observer going behind him.

7. What helped most when conducting hasty house searches? N/A.

8. What helped most during the checkpoint operations?

Platoon Commander - prior rehearsal.

Team Leader - communications and security.

9. What did not work well during patrolling?

Platoon Commander - MILES 2000 went off w/out shots being fired

Team Leader - following team leader

Team Leader - everything worked good

Team Leader - the pace was too fast in the beginning

CAAT Team Leader - did not know exact location of obj and no identified it when we got there.

10. What did not work well when conducting personnel searches?

Team Leader - SAW gunner for searching.

11. What did not work well during checkpoint operations?

Team Leader - the road was too narrow.

12. In your opinion, how well trained was your element to conduct this mission?

BILLET	N/A	POOR	AVG	A/A	EX	O/S	REMARKS
Platoon Leader				X			
Platoon Sgt	X						
Team Leader		X					No BUST
Team Leader						X	
Team Leader					X		
CAAT Leader			X				
CAAT Leader			X				

13. What specific training best prepared your element during this event?

Platoon Commander - practicing VCP all day long at the MOUT facility.

Team Leader - BUST school.

Team Leader - training a week before (Did not attend BUST)

CAAT Team Leader – BUST.

14. What training does your group think was needed but did not receive for this mission?

Platoon Commander - ...establishing CCP and having a "what if" scenario.

CAAT Team Leader - training in bigger areas to use trucks in.

15. List three (3) things your unit learned during this event that would help Marines in the future:

1.

Platoon Commander - don't fall in love with your plan - be flexible

T ldr - satellite - bounding over watch

Team Leader - check behind seat compartments

Team Leader - use of ICOMs.

CAAT Team Leader - how to patrol in a real world environment.

2.

Platoon Commander - task organizing to the lowest levels.

Team Leader - personnel searches - no saw security on personnel.

Team Leader - check under wheel covers in trunk.

Team Leader – security.

CAAT Team Leader - position of security when you place them.

3.

Platoon Commander - shed ideas of traditional linear movement.

Team Leader - 360-degree security.

Team Leader - check under vehicle.

Team Leader - keeping a good pace

16. Was any of your unit's equipment or vehicles damaged or destroyed, including attachments to your unit? List type of equipment, how damage was inflicted and location. No.

17. What other organizational or equipment changes does your group recommend to make the element more effective than it was?

Platoon Commander - headpiece on ICOM, too much rear, recommend using the knee pads in utilities.

Team Leader - another fire team.

Team Leader - more Marines in the squad.

CAAT Team Leader - ICOMs for CAAT

18. Use the remaining space to make any other comments you have about THIS PARTICULAR event:

Platoon Commander - too many evaluators in the VCP. Difficult to tell who was searching or just observing. Made control difficult. Being in the city heightened senses and added an additional layer of realism to the scenario. Having civilians playing role players provided extra realism. Also showed marines how to move and recognize threats in an unfamiliar environment

**KEY LEADER'S QUESTIONNAIRE: TO BE COMPLETED BY PLATOON
COMMANDER, PLT SGT, SQD LDR'S, FIRE TEAM LDR'S, AND ATTACHMENT
CMDR'S**

PK/PE PATROLLING

19. Did you think the satelliting technique taught was effective? Y/N

- Y - Platoon Commander - the pattern of movement was random and unpredictable to the enemy
- Y - Team Leader
- Y - Team Leader - keep enemy off guard
- Y - Team Leader
- Y - CAAT Team Leader

20. Did you think the task organization of your unit was effective? Y/N

- Y/N - Platoon Commander - we could have task organized down to lower levels
- Y - Team Leader
- Y - Team Leader
- Y - Team Leader
- Y - CAAT Team Leader

21. Did your task organization allow you the flexibility to transition from "block II" to "block III" intensity? Y/N.

- Y - Platoon Commander
- Y - Team Leader
- Y - Team Leader
- Y - CAAT Team Leader

N - Team Leader -

22. Was command and control of your element easier or more difficult? Y/N

- Y/N - Platoon Commander - easier with the use of comm, harder in the wood line due to vegetation
- Y - Team Leader - easier
- Y - Team Leader - easier in satelliting patrolling
- Y - Team Leader - the ICOMs made control easier

23. What aspects of the satelliting or patrolling technique did not work well?

- Platoon Commander - we felt that all aspects worked well
- Team Leader - more bounding needed
- Team Leader - the beginning pace
- CAAT Team Leader - hard to tell when the patrol was completely through an area

24. How can the technique be improved?

- Platoon Commander - getting a better SA of what the terrain consists of
- Team Leader - communication and practice
- Team Leader - start out with a good pace
- CAAT Team Leader - better communication

CHECKPOINT OPERATIONS

HASTY (VCP)

25. Did you think the HASTY VCP technique and procedure taught was effective? Y/N

Y - Team Leader

Y - Team Leader

Y - Team Leader

N - Platoon Commander - do not agree with the searcher being unarmed

26. Did you think the task organization of your unit was effective? Y/N

Y/N - Platoon Commander - I think we could have task organized at lower levels

Y - Team Leader

Y - Team Leader

Y - Team Leader

27. Make comments on command and control for the HASTY VCP conducted.

Platoon Commander - ICOM eased the burden of C2 on the unit leaders

28. What aspects of the HASTY VCP technique did not work well?

Platoon Commander - all aspects worked well

Team Leader - communication should have been better

Team Leader - the road was too small

29. How can the technique be improved?

Team Leader - practice

Team Leader - more Marines

PERSONNEL SEARCHES

30. Did you think the contact and non-contact techniques taught were effective?

Yes

31. Did you think the search procedures taught were effective? Y/N

Y/N - Platoon Commander - the search methods were good, but I would suggest having more positive control of the suspect

Y - Team Leader

32. What is the ideal size element for the conduct of personnel searches?

Platoon Commander - 3 - one to search, one to cover, one to act as escort and supervisor


Team Leader - I like a fire team

33. How can the technique be improved?

Platoon Commander - retain more positive control over individual being searched.

Team Leader - practice.

EVENT THREE



19 Feb 02
1st Platoon
Security Patrol
0723-1157

Role Player Location

K ⊠ 8

Patrol T/O:
The platoon was split. The Platoon Commander commanded the patrol with the Plt Sgt remaining at the patrol base with the reaction force.

HQ	4
TM	4
CAAT	4 (HMG Variant)
CAAT	4 (HMG Variant)

Prep for combat was much improved. The pace of the patrol was also slowed, improving individual Marine SA. The satelliting techniques improved throughout the patrol. The individual teams had good dispersion, and 2-man teams stuck close together. The HMG CAAT variants stopped by fences when buildings were not available, using them as potential RPG screens. The PL did a good job of writing down information in his patrol logbook from a planned role player informant. The PL forwarded the info to higher.

Event Three Feedback Summary

Unit: 1st Platoon **Mission:** Day security patrol

Total BLUFOR in box: 24

OPFOR: none

Role players: 1

Overall Comments:

- Patrol route covered 4 hour and 34 minutes and covered a total of 54 blocks of foot movement, to and from patrol base.
- Improvement in satelliting techniques.
- Better prep for combat.
- Recorded information from role player in logbook and forwarded info to higher.
- CAAT vehicles stopped by fences so as to use them as potential RPG screens.

1. **How many casualties/POWs did your element have and/or inflict? N/A.**
2. **Did you conduct a Casualty Evacuation (CASEVAC) for these casualties? N/A.**
3. **In your opinion, did your element accomplish its mission? Y / N.**
 - Y - Platoon Commander -
 - Y - Team Leader
 - Y - Team Leader
 - Y - Team Leader
 - Y - CAAT Team Leader
 - Y - CAAT Team Leader

GENERAL QUESTIONS FOR ENTIRE UNIT (COMPLETE FOR PATROLLING AND ANY OTHER TASK COMPLETED DURING EXPERIMENT)

4. **What helped most during patrolling?**

Platoon Commander - satelliting, teams can react to each other and it confuses the enemy
Team Leader - satelliting, comm, knowing where the HQ was.
Team Leader - comm procedures...with ICOM.
Team Leader – comm.
CAAT Team Leader - communication, bounding.
CAAT Team Leader - comm, tactics bounding.

5. **What did not work well during patrolling?**

Platoon Commander - movement too close within satelliting teams.
Team Leader - the MBITR.
Team Leader - the MBITR, I lost comm for about 45 min.
Team Leader - other teams comms went down and could not communicate with them, but my comm was great...

CAAT Team Leader - the route was closed at one point vehicles had to stay static too long

6. In your opinion, how well trained was your element to conduct this mission?

BILLET	N/A	POOR	AVG	A/A	EX	O/S	REMARKS
Platoon Leader				X			
Platoon Sgt	X						
Team Leader					X		No BUST
Team Leader				X			
Team Leader					X		
CAAT Leader					X		
CAAT Leader				X			

7. What specific training best prepared your element during this event?

- Platoon Commander - BUST course
- Team Leader - MOUT patrols
- Team Leader - individual team handling
- Team Leader - BUST course last week
- CAAT Team Leader - satellite patrolling
- CAAT Team Leader - vehicle movement training

8. What training does your group think was needed but did not receive for this mission?

- Team Leader - more team time in a urban environment

9. List three (3) things your unit learned during this event that would help Marines in the future:

1.
 - Platoon Commander - more team dispersion
 - Team Leader - better comm
 - Team Leader - ...more dispersion on each...2 man team
 - Team Leader - satellite as a team better
 - CAAT Team Leader - do not trust the map 100%
 - CAAT Team Leader - more cover when stopped
2.
 - Platoon Commander - less ISR use
 - Team Leader - quicken movement
 - Team Leader - always keep visual contact with another team
 - Team Leader - keeping in touch with each other
 - CAAT Team Leader - look for alternate ways to doing checkpoints
3.
 - Platoon Commander - better comm from higher
 - Team Leader- comm with CAAT
 - Team Leader - pace yourself in order to keep morale up
 - Team Leader - find better cover and concealment
 - CAAT Team Leader - find more cover for vehicle security when on long halts

10. Was any of your unit's equipment or vehicles damaged or destroyed, including attachments to your unit? List type of equipment, how damage was inflicted and location. N/A

11. What other organizational or equipment changes does your group recommend to make the element more effective than it was?

Team Leader - better comm

Team Leader - Team leaders should have a radio for his team and another one for the squad...but teams should have their own tac (frequency channel)

Team Leader - better comm

CAAT Team Leader - give all elements of the patrol the same comm as other teams

CAAT Team Leader – GPS

12. Use the remaining space to make any other comments you have about THIS PARTICULAR event:

KEY LEADER'S QUESTIONNAIRE: TO BE COMPLETED BY PLATOON COMMANDER, PLT SGT, SQD LDR'S, FIRE TEAM LDR'S, AND ATTACHMENT CMDR'S

PK/PE PATROLLING

13. Did you think the satelliting technique taught was effective? Y/N

Y - Platoon Commander -

Y - Team Leader - because we were not just walking up the middle of the street

Y - Team Leader - it confuses the people around

Y - Team Leader - it can confuse the enemy better

Y - CAAT Team Leader -

Y - CAAT Team Leader

14. Did you think the task organization of your unit was effective? Y/N

Y - Platoon Commander

Y - Team Leader-

Y - Team Leader - we all work well as a team

Y - CAAT Team Leader

Y - CAAT Team Leader

15. Did your task organization allow you the flexibility to transition from “block II” to “block III” intensity? Y/N

Y - Team Leader - because we can move in from all points

Y - CAAT Team Leader

Y - CAAT Team Leader

N - Team Leader

N/A - Platoon Commander - no contact

16. Was command and control of your element easier or more difficult? Y/N

Y - Platoon Commander

Y - Team Leader - easier because I only had to talk to my team and deal with no one else

- Team Leader - well the control I had.... was about the same except when there was a lot of traffic

Y - Team Leader - easier for me cause I had good comm with them

Y - CAAT Team Leader - easier

17. What aspects of the satelliting or patrolling technique did not work well?

Platoon Commander - two man teams need more dispersion

Team Leader - able to cover more ground

CAAT Team Leader - linking up from front of patrol to back


18. How can the technique be improved? Explain your answer.

Platoon Commander - more work, many new Marines in the unit that need BUST

Team Leader - use it more (train more with it).



EVENT FOUR



House Search

19 Feb 02
3rd Platoon
House Search
1132-1348

K 8

Patrol T/O:
 The platoon was split. The Plt Sgt commanded the patrol with the Platoon Commander remaining at the patrol base with the reaction force.
 HQ 3
 Sniper 2
 PAO 2
 EOD 2
 TM 4
 TM 5
 TM 5
 CAAT 4 (HMG Variant)
 CAAT 4 (HMG Variant)

Problems with the orders process were observed. No terrain model, fires support plan, tactical control measures, or linkup plan with reaction forces were discussed. CAAT moved too independently from the dismounted ground patrol, even driving in front of the target house multiple times. Need to develop lost comm procedures/SOPs for satelliting elements. Reaction force timeline:
 1303 QRF called for
 1316 QRF departs patrol base
 1322 QRF linkups w/ patrol HQ
 1343 QRF enters house
 House search turned into assault and clearing operation. Almost went into wrong house, 1403 Pine vs. 1403 Vine. Heavy rain and lightening shortened event. Heavy media and other observers created confusion in objective area.

Event Four Feedback Summary

Unit: 3rd Platoon **Mission:** Day security patrol and house search

Total BLUFOR in box: 49

OPFOR: 5

Role players: 6

Overall Comments:

- Patrol took 1 hour and 2 minutes to cover a total 21 blocks of foot movement, from firm base to ORP for house search.
- Almost went in wrong house, problem with Pine vs. Vine.
- CAAT moving very independently, good use of alleys, passed target house multiple of times, alerting OPFOR.
- Need "lost comm" procedures for satelitting elements, especially CAAT.
- No QRF link up procedures covered in frag order, QRF drivers need to attend frag order.
- House search turned into assault and clearing operation
- When activities began to turn bad, killed off OPFOR administratively to keep event moving.
- Heavy rains and lightning shortened event.
- Heavy media and other observers created confusion in objective area.

1. How many casualties/POWs did your element have and/or inflict?

ELEMENT	KIA	WIA	PW/EPW
OPFOR	3	1	1
BLUFOR	1	3	0
Noncombatants	0	0	0

2. Did you conduct a Casualty Evacuation (CASEVAC) for these casualties?

Time of Request	Location of CASEVAC	Number of Casualties	Time CASEVAC Executed	Who Conducted How Conducted
N/A	1403 Vine St	BLUFOR - 4 OPFOR - 4	1350	QRF by 5T

3. In your opinion, did your element accomplish its mission? Y/N

- Y – Platoon Leader (PL)
- Y - Team Leader
- Y - Team Leader
- Y - Team Leader

- Y - sniper
- Y - CAAT tm
- Y - QRF

GENERAL QUESTIONS FOR ENTIRE UNIT (COMPLETE FOR PATROLLING AND ANY OTHER TASK COMPLETED DURING EXPERIMENT)

4. What helped most during patrolling -

PL - all personnel are independent and act on their own initiative...small unit leadership is key.

Team Leader - communication, we knew where HQ was at all times and knew where other teams were.

Team Leader - communication with each other, bounding, splitting the fire team up.

Team Leader - ICOMs (squad radios) satellite patrols.

Sniper - satellite patrols by CAAT and team's constant comm allowed easy adaptation to environment.

CAAT tm - security for vehicle and constant moving of vehicle.

QRF - having random movement.

5. What helped most when conducting hasty house searches-

Team Leader - Intel prior and during.

Sniper - security around the house.

QRF - practicing before hand.

6. What did not work well during patrolling?

PL - mapping was wrong, beginning of friendly lines was sloppy.

Team Leader - too many reporters and HQ moving too fast.

Team Leader - lack of individual placements on bounds, fire teams first time working as a team, lack of rehearsals.

Team Leader - more ICOMs so the team leaders can talk to his team (all of them).

CAAT tm - coordination with all elements.

7. What did not work well when conducting hasty house searches?

PL - didn't take enough Marines initially for a raid.

Team Leader - intel from S2 was wrong and that delayed time on target.

Sniper - listening to security outside the house.

8. In your opinion, how well trained was your element to conduct this mission?

BILLET	N/A	POOR	AVG	A/A	EX	O/S	REMARKS
Platoon Leader				X			
Platoon Sgt	X						
Team Leader			X				
Team Leader				X			
Team Leader					X		
CAAT Leader					X		
QRF Leader				X			

9. What specific training best prepared your element during this event?

PL - 2 man entry.
Team Leader - we received all the training we needed.
Team Leader - only had 3 days to prepare.
Team Leader - BUST, individual SOPs.
Sniper - urban operations for scout snipers.
CAAT tm - BUST at MOUT.
QRF - working on house searches at MOUT.

10. What training does your group think was needed but did not receive for this mission?

PL - training with more than just our squad.
Team Leader - we needed more practical (application).
Team Leader - new Marines had no MOUT training.
Team Leader - more understanding of a MOUT environment.
Sniper - prior insertion.

11. List three (3) things your unit learned during this event that would help Marines in the future:

1.
 - PL - How to satellite patrol on a bigger scale
 - Team Leader - dealing with civilians
 - Team Leader - better rehearsals
 - Team Leader - don't trust maps
 - Sniper - patrolling tech
 - CAAT tm - coordination
 - QRF - Block 2 moves to block 3 very fast
2.
 - PL - How to use intel
 - Team Leader - maneuvering in a real life environment
 - Team Leader - more training
 - Team Leader - intel is only half right
 - Sniper - supporting an urban patrol
 - CAAT tm - timely movement to the objective
 - QRF - write an order for the react force
3.
 - PL - work with attachments
 - Team Leader - blocking off streets
 - Team Leader - be prepared for anything
 - Team Leader - know your Marines abilities
 - Sniper - security and raid tactics
 - CAAT tm - know abilities and limitation of attack
 - QRF - stage react force on the vehicles

12. Was any of your unit's equipment or vehicles damaged or destroyed, including attachments to your unit? List type of equipment, how damage was inflicted and location. N/A.

13. What other organizational or equipment changes does your group recommend to make the element more effective than it was?

PL - train our Marines to be more efficient to the individual actions

Team Leader - the equipment weighing less would be more effective for maneuvering

QRF - tear gas

KEY LEADER'S QUESTIONNAIRE: TO BE COMPLETED BY PLT CMDR, PLT SGT, SQD LDR'S, FIRE TEAM LDR'S, AND ATTACHMENT CMDR'S

PK/PE PATROLLING

14. Did you think the satelliting technique taught was effective? Y/N

Y - PL - has the tendency to already be in a chaotic patrol instead of reacting and becoming one

Y - Team Leader

Y - Team Leader

Y - sniper - because the enemy didn't know where we were coming from

Y - CAAT tm - allows you to confuse the enemy

N - Team Leader - new Marines need practice

15. Did you think the task organization of your unit was effective? Y/N

Y - PL - our unit was well organized for mission of hasty search, not an entry stack

Y - Team Leader

Y - Team Leader

Y - Team Leader

Y - CAAT tm - allowed us to intimidate the enemy

16. Did your task organization allow you the flexibility to transition from "block II" to "block III" intensity? Y/N

Y - PL - but never conducted either

Y - Team Leader

Y - Team Leader

Y - sniper - because of 2 man teams

Y - CAAT tm

N - Team Leader - needed more Marines

17. Was command and control of your element easier or more difficult? . Y/N

Y - PL - easier let small unit leadership control

Y - Team Leader - smaller element to control

Y - Team Leader - easier to control my team

Y - Team Leader

Y - CAAT tm - easier good comm

18. What aspects of the satelliting or patrolling technique did not work well?

PL - working with attachments more - EOD, snipers

Y - Team Leader - speed of movement

Y - Team Leader - knowing where the other satelliting units were
Y - Team Leader -

19. How can the technique be improved?

PL - work on more comm between teams
Team Leader - practice
Team Leader - each team should have a breach kit

HASTY HOUSE SEARCH

20. Did you think the technique taught was effective? Y/N

Y - PL - but more entry tactics need to be taught
Y - Team Leader
Y - QRF - as long as you have enough personnel

21. Did you think the search procedures taught were effective? (Inner and outer cordon, search team) Y/N

Y - PL - but always prep for the worst
Y - Team Leader
Y - QRF

22. What aspects of the technique did not work well?

Team Leader - switching to a hasty raid


23. How can the technique be improved?

PL - teach them breaching and clearing of multiple rooms (ed. this is taught in BUST...?)

24. Did you think the task organization of your unit was effective? Y/N

Y - PL - for a house search, but not a raid.

Event Five



Patrol T/O:
 The platoon was split.
 The Platoon Commander commanded the patrol with the Plt Sgt remaining at the patrol base with the reaction force.

HQ	6
TM	4
TM	4
TM	4
CAAT	4 (HMG Variant)
CAAT	4 (HMG Variant)

Two OPFOR in one car and five role players in three cars were used at the HVCP location. The patrol did not conduct rehearsals or review assignments for conducting a HVCP. Misunderstanding between the differences in a snap and HVCP were evident. CAAT vehicles were used to form a moving roadblock. Lots of confusion was seen at first with all patrol participants swarming on the VCP location, result of a poor prior planning. Patrol element did not disperse even though brevity code for finding an IED was given. Element tended to focus inward vice keeping those not directly involved with the search looking outward. Patrol sent EPWs off with one of the CAAT vehicles resulting in a loss of firepower. Equipment the patrol could have benefited from: multiple sets of flex cuffs, larger mirrors for looking under the vehicle, and cross body slings for those involved in the search.

Event Five Feedback Summary

Event #5 **Date:** 19 Feb 02 **Time:** 1530-1745

Unit: 2nd Platoon **Mission:** Day security patrol/snap VCP

Total BLUFOR in box: 26 (1/24/1)

OPFOR: 2 in 1 car

Role Players: 5 in 3 cars

Overall Comments:

- Patrol covered 38 blocks from start to finish in 2 hours including snap VCP.
- Patrol took 1 hour and 20 minutes to cover 19 blocks of foot movement to go from firm base to snap VCP location.
- Did not conduct rehearsals, which became a problem noted by team leaders.
- Did not review assignments for conducting a snap VCP.
- There is confusion between a snap and hasty VCP.
- Lots of confusion at first, all swarmed on VCP location, lack of assigned tasks prior to starting patrol.
- Used CAAT vehicles to form moving roadblock.
- One set of flex cuffs, needed more.
- Though proper use of code word for IED, element did not disperse a distance away from vehicle.
- Radios enabled increased SA of team members on vehicle to be stopped.
- Could have used larger mirrors, could be carried by CAAT vehicles.
- Cross body slings could have assisted those involved in search.
- Tended to focus inward, need to keep those not directly involved with search looking outward.
- What do you do with anyone detained? Sent EPWs off with one of the CAAT vehicles, loss of firepower

1. How many casualties/POWs did your element have and/or inflict?

ELEMENT	KIA	WIA	PW/EPW
OPFOR	0	0	2
BLUFOR	0	0	0
Noncombatants	0	0	0

2. Did you conduct a Casualty Evacuation (CASEVAC) for these casualties? N/A

3. In your opinion, did your element accomplish its mission? Y / N

Y - PL -

Y - APL
Y - HQ Team Leader
Y - Team Leader
Y - Team Leader
Y - Team Leader
Y - CAAT

GENERAL QUESTIONS FOR ENTIRE UNIT (COMPLETE FOR PATROLLING AND ANY OTHER TASK COMPLETED DURING EXPERIMENT)

4. What helped most during patrolling -

PL - satellite tactics, allows for flexibility, comms helped patrolling go smoother
APL - buddy teams, communications - it would be very difficult to conduct satellite patrols with out widespread comm equipment
HQ Team Leader - good satelliting patrolling, good comm - the PRR - I could talk to my man at any time...
Team Leader - satellite patrol movement and PRRs & 148s helped to inform my team....
Team Leader - comm and keep team informed
Team Leader - satellite technique and PRR (comm between the fire team)
CAAT - staying fairly close with the foot patrol and maintaining good comm...

5. What helped most when conducting personnel searches –

PL - being aggressive and systematic

6. What helped most when conducting vehicle searches-

PL - being systematic....

7. What helped most during the checkpoint operations –?

Team Leader - going firm and giving location

8. What did not work well during patrolling?

PL - using the Guide during patrolling - not the actual concept of the Guide, but the way it was employed in the patrol
HQ Team Leader - hand and arm signals, we didn't use them barley any, we were relying too much on the PRR
Team Leader - losing sight of one another....
Team Leader - comm-PRR, not clear on certain roads
Team Leader - one out the four PRRs had problems
CAAT - procedures on who was going to actually conduct the vehicle search and personnel search

9. What did not work well when conducting personnel searches?

APL - lack of specific tasks with in the fire teams - search man, cover man, demonstrator, etc.

10. What did not work well when conducting vehicle searches?

PL - the difference between HVCP and deliberate is not fully understood
Team Leader - when everyone swarmed the vehicle check point site

11. What did not work well during checkpoint operations?

Team Leader - sitting too long in one place and security on avenues of approach

12. In your opinion, how well trained was your element to conduct this mission?

BILLET	N/A	POOR	AVG	A/A	EX	O/S	REMARKS
Platoon Leader				X			
Asst Platoon Ldr					X		
Team Leader			X				
Team Leader			X				
Team Leader					X		
HQ Team Leader				X			
CAAT Leader				X			

13. What specific training best prepared your element during this event?

PL - BUST training

APL - BUST

HQ Team Leader - BUST training

Team Leader - the little bit of BUST that they got a week before

Team Leader - going through MOUT town and BUST training

Team Leader - BUST, training with the platoon

CAAT - the MOUT facility back in Lejune and CAAT's ability to satellite as well as a foot patrol

14. What training does your group think was needed but did not receive for this mission?

APL - same training and more squad leader/team leader time

Team Leader - a little more BUST, maybe some SOTG

Team Leader - more training in MOUT and working in this type of environment

Team Leader - more BUST

15. List three (3) things your unit learned during this event that would help Marines in the future:

1.

PL - expect what you inspect

APL - buddy teams work

HQ Team Leader - good satellite patrols

Team Leader - never lose sight of your team members, make sure at least one of the pairs has eyes on

Team Leader - hand signals in case comm goes out

Team Leader - rehearsals

CAAT - not to always rely on comm

2.

PL - learn the changing threat level and how to react appropriately

APL dispersion/360 security is a necessity

HQ Team Leader - hand and arm signals

Team Leader - get more aggressive training in an actual city as opposed to a fake town

Team Leader - have more time to go over route and checkpoints - time management
Team Leader - communications
CAAT - spread out during the vehicle search for better usage and security w/ the 50 cal we had

3.

PL - do not focus inward
APL - a Sgt squad leader as opposed to a 2nd Lt platoon commander is fully if not more capable of running his squad of Marines successfully
HQ Team Leader - buddy teams work
Team Leader - designate jobs as to a snap vehicle checkpoint
Team Leader - more rehearsals and set SOPs
Team Leader - micro-terrain
CAAT - make sure we know exactly what route is being taken

16. Was any of your unit's equipment or vehicles damaged or destroyed, including attachments to your unit? List type of equipment, how damage was inflicted and location. N/A

17. What other organizational or equipment changes does your group recommend to make the element more effective than it was?

PL - the organization was good, it would be beneficial to get rid of as much gear as possible, it restricts movement, speed and flexibility, it is not so much that the gear is heavy, it is awkward.
APL - the PRR/MBITR combination works pretty well as long as the MBITR is not freq hopping
HQ Team Leader - wearing the equipment the way each and every man wants
Team Leader - have the same camo pattern for uniforms and gear/LBE/flack
Team Leader - better comm, further range
Team Leader - SOPs, more rehearsals, equipment OK
CAAT - clarifying what teams are going to do what in a hasty situation

18. Use the remaining space to make any other comments you have about THIS PARTICULAR event:

PL- satellite patrolling is very effective in the urban environment. the other techniques for searches are good, but probably no better than other tech.

KEY LEADER'S QUESTIONNAIRE: TO BE COMPLETED BY PLT CMDR, PLT SGT, SQD LDR'S, FIRE TEAM LDR'S, AND ATTACHMENT CMDR'S

PK/PE PATROLLING

19. Did you think the satelliting technique taught was effective? Y/N

Y - PL - the tech is very effective and it allows for flexibility
Y - APL - it is unpredictable and allows more ground to be covered
Y - HQ Team Leader - because no one in the town can tell how many people are really there
Y - Team Leader - but the team members are brand new and only had a week practice...
Y - Team Leader

Y - Team Leader it gives more flexibility and allows more area to be covered
Y - CAAT - so we did not keep the same route and movement to keep enemy on their toes

20. Did you think the task organization of your unit was effective? Y/N

Y - PL - the team leaders were effective and understood the mission
Y - APL - 1,2,3,& HQ worked well, but the T/O during vehicle searches could use some work
Y - HQ Team Leader - satellite patrolling worked well
Y - Team Leader - they are learning
Y - CAAT - all Marines in the vehicle knew what was being done

N - Team Leader - wasn't clear during vehicle check point prior to check point
N - more tasking before leaving on patrol

21. Did your task organization allow you the flexibility to transition from “block II” to “block III” intensity? Y/N

Y - PL
Y - APL
Y - HQ Team Leader - covering all avenues of approaches
Y - Team Leader
Y - Team Leader
Y - CAAT

22. Was command and control of your element easier or more difficult? Y/N

Y - PL - easier because the system was more flexible
Y/N - APL - it was harder, because of distance, but easier because of SA & intel gained from the coverage
Y - HQ Team Leader - we were all near each other to communicate
Y - Team Leader - rusty at first but picked up as it went on
Y - Team Leader - it was a little easier because more room to make own decisions instead of playing follow the leader
Y - Team Leader - easier because of PRRs, every Marine had one
Y - CAAT - easier with the variety of comm

23. What aspects of the satelliting or patrolling technique did not work well?

PL - the tech is good for the urban environment, but I don't believe it would transfer to the woods
APL - I thought it is an outstanding concept with no noticeable faults
HQ Team Leader - satellite patrols went too far out
Team Leader - the understanding/grasping of the new ones
Team Leader - comm at times

24. How can the technique be improved?

PL - the use of street names and restaurants was easier
APL - Squad leaders should be the PLs, they are the ones running it anyway
HQ Team Leader - having patrol routes and check points for the satellite patrols
Team Leader - practice

CHECKPOINT OPERATIONS

SNAP (VCP)

25. Did you think the SNAP VCP technique taught was effective? Y/N

Y - PL - I think it was taught well, but we still need to work on the use of terms - hast vs snap

Y - APL -

Y - HQ Team Leader - but we didn't use it properly

Y - Team Leader - for what it is worth, but practice and job tasking will help

Y - Team Leader - it was taught well, just didn't rehearse enough

Y - Team Leader - I think more practice and SOPs would help make things easier

Y - CAAT - we took the vehicle by surprise

26. What aspects of the SNAP VCP technique did not work well?

PL - maintaining the satellite formation

APL - lack of preparation led to Marines unsure of their specific roles

HQ Team Leader - checking the car, plus personnel

Team Leader - the swarming of everyone at the snap checkpoint

Team Leader - our not having SOPs and talking the VCP through before hand would have helped

CAAT - procedures on what team was going to do what

27. How can the technique be improved? Explain your answer.

PL - it need to be practiced more not changed or improved

APL - not sure

HQ Team Leader - have roll in each team

Team Leader - more practice

Team Leader - I think every aspect is fine

CAAT - training on the snap VCP for specialized teams

PERSONNEL SEARCHES

28. Did you think the contact and non-contact techniques taught were effective?

a. Contact Y/N

Y - APL - got the job done

Y - HQ Team Leader - the Marines did like the way they were taught

Y - Team Leader

Y - Team Leader

b. Non-contact Y/N

Y - HQ Team Leader - the Marines did like the way they were taught

Y - Team Leader - didn't bring the proper equipment

Y - Team Leader - the techniques work well as is

29. Did you think the search procedures taught were effective? (Comment at a minimum on sequence of search and tasks such as demonstrator, searcher, observer, and coverman) Y/N

APL - provides security as well as "interpreter"

Y - Team Leader

30. What is the ideal size element for the conduct of personnel searches?

APL - its fine like it is

Team Leader - 3 cover men, at least 2 to hold down

Team Leader - a fire team works well, anything larger would be too many


31. How can the technique be improved?

APL - if performed properly, I don't know how it could be improved

Team Leader - practice

Team Leader - the techniques work well as is

Event Six



OPFOR Location

19 Feb 02
1st Platoon
Security
Patrol
2014-2250

K 8

Patrol T/O:
 The platoon was split. The Plt Sgt commanded the patrol with the Platoon Commander remaining at the patrol base with the reaction force.
 HQ 5
 TM 4
 TM 4
 TM 4
 CAAT 4 (HMG Variant)
 CAAT 4 (HMG Variant)
 QRF 1/12 * (3 HMMWVs)
 *Called but did not deploy

Battle prep for the patrol was improved compared to previous patrols. However, NVG preparation was lacking. Some new joins seemed unfamiliar with the equipment. Movement before the contact seemed to go smoothly. The patrol had internal communication problems while on Main Street and bastardized the ICOM to compensate. 2 OPFOR were used during this event. Both were killed but booby-trapped their bodies resulting in BLUEFOR KIA because of a failure to use proper search techniques. At 2201 shots were fired and at 2226 the OPFOR building was cleared and secured. SA was difficult to maintain at night for the PL. After the contact and consolidation, the patrol was put into a PAUSEX to account for ammunition and grenade bodies. The QRF was called but turned off by the head OC. The patrol regrouped and moved back to the company patrol base afoot.

Event Six Feedback Summary

Unit: 1st Platoon **Mission:** Night security patrol

Total BLUFOR in box: 25

OPFOR: 2

Role players: None

Overall Comments:

- Patrol lasted 2 hours and 36 minutes from start to PAUSEX at warehouse.
- Took patrol 1 hour and 46 minutes to cover 38 blocks by foot movement, from firm base to warehouse.
- Made contact about mid way through patrol.
- Began patrol without prepping NVGs for use, had problems putting on NVGs, seemed unfamiliar with equipment.
- Communication problems with PRC-148 noted, went to ICOM as back-up primary.
- May not have had enough personnel to smoothly transition to block 3 and engage enemy effectively.
- Number of casualties from booby traps and grenades hidden under OPFOR bodies.

1. How many casualties/POWs did your element have and/or inflict?

ELEMENT	KIA	WIA	PW/EPW
OPFOR	2	0	0
BLUFOR	4	0	0
Noncombatants	0	0	0

2. Did you conduct a Casualty Evacuation (CASEVAC) for these casualties?

Time of Request	Location of CASEVAC	Number of Casualties	Time CASEVAC Executed	Who Conducted How Conducted
2230	7 th and Magnolia	BLUFOR -3 OPFOR - 0	2240	HMMWV

3. In your opinion, did your element accomplish its mission? Y / N

- Y - PL
- Y - Team Leader
- Y - Team Leader
- Y - Team Leader
- Y - CAAT

GENERAL QUESTIONS FOR ENTIRE UNIT (COMPLETE FOR PATROLLING AND ANY OTHER TASK COMPLETED DURING EXPERIMENT)

4. What helped most during patrolling?

PL - SA, comm, CAAT, satelliting
 Team Leader - communicating, comm, visual
 Team Leader - ICOMs worked great, having ICOMs and visual contact with other teams greatly facilitates control of units/elements
 Team Leader - satellite patrolling, good team members and some comm
 CAAT - satellite patrol and bounding with CAAT, comm

5. What did not work well during patrolling?

PL - PRC-148
 Team Leader - PRC-148s
 Team Leader - PRC-148s - these radios keep going down
 Team Leader - PRC-148

6. What did not work well when conducting hasty house searches?

PL - entering the house after using a grenade could have been better

7. In your opinion, how well trained was your element to conduct this mission?

BILLET	N/A	POOR	AVG	A/A	EX	O/S	REMARKS
Platoon Leader					X		
Asst Platoon Ldr	X						
Team Leader					X		
Team Leader					X		
Team Leader					X		
HQ Team Leader	X						
CAAT Leader					X		

8. What specific training best prepared your element during this event?

PL - BUST
 Team Leader - BUST course
 Team Leader - more of the basic MOUT training on actual cities
 Team Leader - satellite patrolling
 CAAT - BUST course

9. What training does your group think was needed but did not receive for this mission?

Team Leader - more of the same training

10. List three (3) things your unit learned during this event that would help Marines in the future:

1.
 PL - too much ICOM usage
 Team Leader- never split up elements
 Team Leader - make sure we fight like we train...

Team Leader - how important comm was
CAAT - continue to work with comm

2.

PL - check in w/ APL/PL

Team Leader - always have more than 1 Marine providing security when searching casualties

Team Leader - keep constant comm

Team Leader - confusion between fire teams

3.

Team Leader - always let main element know your position

Team Leader - to control the patrol pace and not over exhaust ourselves

Team Leader - good to medium room clearing

11. Was any of your unit's equipment or vehicles damaged or destroyed, including attachments to your unit? List type of equipment, how damage was inflicted and location. N/A

12. What other organizational or equipment changes does your group recommend to make the element more effective than it was?

Team Leader - better com

CAAT - ICOMs for all CAAT personnel

13. Use the remaining space to make any other comments you have about THIS PARTICULAR event:

Team Leader - need more training in these type of environments

CAAT - I think the platoon should have suppressed the building with at least SAWs before entering, since we had already received fire

KEY LEADER'S QUESTIONNAIRE: TO BE COMPLETED BY PLT CMDR, PLT SGT, SQD LDR'S, FIRE TEAM LDR'S, AND ATTACHMENT CMDR'S

PK/PE PATROLLING

14. Did you think the satelliting technique taught was effective? Y/N

Y - PL - it works well

Y - Team Leader - classes taught prior to training were easy to understand

Y - Team Leader - we can cover a greater area and present smaller individual targets while providing 360 security

Y - Team Leader - worked well where we were hit

Y - CAAT - keeps everyone watching confused

15. Did you think the task organization of your unit was effective? Y/N

Y - PL - I suppose everything went well

Y - Team Leader - patrol was very well organized and communicated

Y - Team Leader - we were working individually but as a team

Y - Team Leader - accomplished the mission

Y - CAAT - Yes, 1st Platoon and CAAT for the most part were aware of the other's position

16. Did your task organization allow you the flexibility to transition from “block II” to “block III” intensity? Y/N

Y - PL

Y - Team Leader - it happened during our patrol and we transitioned effectively

Y - Team Leader - we had a lot more freedom to satellite and constant comm made everything easier

Y - Team Leader

17. Was command and control of your element easier or more difficult? Y/N

Y - Team Leader - easier, familiarization and ICOMs made it easy

Y - Team Leader - easier cause we had comm with the whole team

Y - CAAT - easier on this patrol because comm is getting better used than previous patrols

N - Team Leader - harder at nighttime

18. What aspects of the satelliting or patrolling technique did not work well?

No answers

19. How can the technique be improved? Explain your answer.

Team Leader - more of the same training

Team Leader - use the technique more often

CAAT - more comm rehearsal



Event Seven

Surrounding home on W. side of Laurel

20 Feb 02
2nd Platoon
House Search
0733-1100

K 8

Search house
211 Laurel

Patrol T/O:
The entire platoon was utilized during this event.

HQ	6	
TM	4	
TM	4	
TM	8	
TM	8	
TM	4	
CAAT Variant	4	(HMG)
CAAT Variant	3	(HMG)

Five OPFOR and seven role players used during this event. The platoon used two routes to move to the site. OCs commented that they began to hear complaints from Marines of being tired, reinforcing the need for a good sleep plan. The first to arrive established the outer cordon with one CAAT vehicle with each major sub unit. Momentum was lost after the outer cordon was established. The designated searchers mention that they thought they carried too much gear to effectively execute their mission. The platoon also noted that any EPWs or detainees should be kept out of view of the local populace. The house search ended up in a major crowd control situation with the role players and media. Some OCs commented that they could have used certain brevity codes for certain activities; weapons found for example. The large crowd of media really was a problem and confused the situation for the Marines.

Event Seven Feedback Summary

Unit: 2nd Platoon **Mission:** Day security patrol/house search

Total BLUFOR in box: 54

OPFOR: 2 (filling sandbags at raid site), 3 at house

Role players: 7 at house

Overall Comments:

- Platoon covered 37 blocks in foot movement during patrol.
- Patrol took 3 hours and 27 minutes, start to finish.
- Patrol took 57 minutes to cover initial 23 blocks during approach movement.
- Some comments about people getting tired - this is on second day.
- Used two routes to move to site, first to arrive had outer cordon, one vehicle with each major sub.
- Took whole platoon to cordon house.
- Searchers wearing too much gear mentioned.
- Recommend moving any EPWs or detainees out of view of populace.
- Need to ensure momentum is maintained once cordons are established.
- House search ended up in a major crowd control situation, role players and media/strap hangers.
- Some O/Cs felt that they could have used some code words for certain activities - found weapons, etc.
- Media was a problem, got in the way, confused the situation.

1. How many casualties/POWs did your element have and/or inflict?

ELEMENT	KIA	WIA	PW/EPW
OPFOR	0	0	3
BLUFOR	0	0	0
Noncombatants	0	0	0

2. Did you conduct a Casualty Evacuation (CASEVAC) for these casualties? NO

3. In your opinion, did your element accomplish its mission? Y / N

Y – PL

Y - Plt Sgt -

Y - Team Leader -

GENERAL QUESTIONS FOR ENTIRE UNIT (COMPLETE FOR PATROLLING AND ANY OTHER TASK COMPLETED DURING EXPERIMENT)

4. What helped most during patrolling?

- PL - communication between all elements helped most
- Plt Sgt - tactics were good equipment had a few drawbacks like the 148
- Team Leader - communications
- Team Leader - comm, good team leader info
- Team Leader - radios worked well, everyone pretty much knew what was going on, searching procedures worked well
- Team Leader - experience of leaders
- Team Leader - the ability to satellite, I like working in smaller independent teams
- Team Leader - comm worked better, satellite patrols were good...
- Team Leader - satellite patrol and bumping around

5. What helped most when conducting personnel searches –

- Team Leader - flexi-cuffs
- Team Leader - 2 man searches, segregation
- Team Leader - communications
- Team Leader - 5 Ss and T

6. What helped most when conducting vehicle searches-

7. What helped most when conducting hasty house searches-

- PL - isolating area
- Team Leader - hand signals
- Team Leader - procedures
- Team Leader - comm

8. What did not work well during patrolling?

- Plt Sgt - having problems with 148 and PRR
- Team Leader - comm by the team leader to his team
- Team Leader - hand signals
- Team Leader - new guys lack of experience
- Team Leader - I was pleased with the way my fire team is beginning to work together on satelliting
- Team Leader - everything was fine except Kilo Alfa and Bravos radios

9. What did not work well when conducting personnel searches?

- Team Leader - having so much gear on
- Team Leader - when we had more than 1 EPW at a time in 1 room

10. What did not work well when conducting hasty house searches?

- PL- everybody came too close to the target when we started bringing the detainees out
- Team Leader - intel
- Team Leader - violence of action
- Team Leader - new guys want to walk in line and not clear houses right

Team Leader - 1st team didn't hear us enter

11. In your opinion, how well trained was your element to conduct this mission?

BILLET	N/A	POOR	AVG	A/A	EX	O/S	REMARKS
Platoon Leader				X			
Asst Platoon Ldr							
Team Leader			X				
Team Leader					X		
Team Leader				X			
Team Leader					X		
Team Leader				X			

12. What specific training best prepared your element during this event?

PL - more of a chance to practice it would help

Plt Sgt - BUST training

Team Leader - experience of senior Marines

Team Leader - my LCpls and above have done the BUST training, but my PFCs haven't had any room clearing training

Team Leader - BUST

Team Leader - none

Team Leader - BUST course

Team Leader - BUST, MOUT

Team Leader - BUST, SOTG

13. What training does your group think was needed but did not receive for this mission?

Plt Sgt - a real city or bigger MOUT facility where satellite patrolling can be conducted

Team Leader - BUST for the new Marines

Team Leader - BUST

Team Leader - new guys needed BUST

Team Leader - more time working on patrolling, room clearing, VCP, personnel searches at the team and squad level

Team Leader - more urban training

Team Leader - more time for BUST for the new guys

14. List three (3) things your unit learned during this event that would help Marines in the future:

1.

PL - do not focus inward

Team Leader - MOUT is not easy

Team Leader - good orders

Team Leader - bounding fire team level

Team Leader - breach team needs breach tools

Team Leader - my team and I can't think of anything....

Team Leader - have separate comm for different squads

Team Leader - you piss off a lot of civilians when you block them off to their daily route

2.

Plt cmdr - do not necessarily have to bring detainees out of house

Team Leader - don't let civilians distract you

Team Leader - satellite patrolling

Team Leader - staggered column while patrolling

3.

Plt cmdr - try to move detainees

Team Leader - patrols in the real urban environment

Team Leader - handling techniques for EPWs

15. Was any of your unit's equipment or vehicles damaged or destroyed, including attachments to your unit? List type of equipment, how damage was inflicted and location. N/A

16. What other organizational or equipment changes does your group recommend to make the element more effective than it was?

PL - air (CAS) would help with recon and if needed support or combat multiplier, it would need to be done smarter than "Blackhawk down" but it would help

Team Leader - not as much gear, TOO MUCH GEAR

Team Leader - we carry too much gear, the PRR radios are great they should be with every Marine

Team Leader - larger range on radios, M4s

Team Leader - lighter gear

17. Use the remaining space to make any other comments you have about THIS PARTICULAR event:

Team Leader - more planning or better planning by higher up

Team Leader - the squad leaders need to have more responsibilities, they turned us into the Army, gave our squads to SNCOs and officers, will they be there in a real world situation?

Team Leader - training in a real city makes everyone more situationally aware

KEY LEADER'S QUESTIONNAIRE: TO BE COMPLETED BY PLT CMDR, PLT SGT, SQD LDR'S, FIRE TEAM LDR'S, AND ATTACHMENT CMDR'S

PK/PE PATROLLING

18. Did you think the satelliting technique taught was effective? Y/N

Y - PL - it is flexible and hides the number of the patrol while still allowing the patrol to employ its combat forces

Y - Plt Sgt - it was but communication was sometimes difficult

Y - Team Leader

Y - Team Leader - its not a hard skill to pick up

Y - Team Leader - - screws everyone up to where the whole unit is

Y - Team Leader - its a good way, confuses the enemy

Y - Team Leader - its a new way to patrol in a urban area, I think it makes perfect sense

Y - Team Leader -

Y - Team Leader -

19. Did you think the task organization of your unit was effective? Y/N

Y - PL - we had two separate patrols to cover the inner and outer cordon respectively, they were able to move in and establish their position smoothly

Y - Team Leader -

Y - Team Leader - accomplished mission

Y - Team Leader - from my stand point, 1st sqd was organized well, and everyone knows exactly what they were doing

Y - Team Leader -

Y - Team Leader -

N - Team Leader - it changed so many times

20. Did your task organization allow you the flexibility to transition from “block II” to “block III” intensity? Y/N

Y - Plt cmdr - there was enough cover to enable units to support each other, the units could adjust quickly to back each other up

Y - Plt Sgt - went from searching house to controlling crowd

Y - Team Leader

Y - Team Leader

Y - Team Leader -

Y - Team Leader -

Y - Team Leader -

21. Was command and control of your element easier or more difficult? Y/N

Y - Team Leader - fatigue is getting to my Marines, less alert

Y - Team Leader - easier, the new Marines really listen to what we tell them

Y - Team Leader - working in smaller units in contact with the command element, its very easy for me to control 2nd fire team

Y - Team Leader -

Y - Team Leader -

N - Plt cmdr - it was more difficult, because of more moving parts but it was workable, not every member of the unit had comm and ...

N - Team Leader - higher was not specific on tasks

22. What aspects of the satelliting or patrolling technique did not work well?

PL - all of the aspects were fairly effective, a single fire team may be a disadvantage if they have contact but the other units are positions can reinforce

Team Leader - satellites was good

Team Leader - our bump was not good

Team Leader - comm

Team Leader - I'm new to satelliting, I have not found anything that has not worked

Team Leader - I think it worked all pretty good today

Team Leader - it was good

23. How can the technique be improved?

Team Leader - work on individual new Marines skills
Team Leader - let squad leaders have time to train their squads
Team Leader - practice, more training in this type of environment
Team Leader - practice

PERSONNEL SEARCHES

24. Did you think the contact and non-contact techniques taught were effective?

a. Contact Y/N

Y - Team Leader -
Y - Team Leader -
Y - Team Leader - learned all the hiding places

b. Non-contact Y/N

Y - Team Leader -
Y - Team Leader -
Y - Team Leader - you can see everything in these clothes

25. Did you think the search procedures taught were effective? (Comment at a minimum on sequence of search and tasks such as demonstrator, searcher, observer, and cover-man) Y/N

Plt Sgt - all we need is cover man and searcher and be aggressive

N - Team Leader - I don't agree that a non-contact search can be as effective

26. What is the ideal size element for the conduct of personnel searches?

Plt Sgt - 2

Team Leader - 2 Marines to 1 EPW unless EPW is to much trouble for 2 men

27. How can the technique be improved?

1 provides security always at a 90 degree the other searches

HASTY HOUSE SEARCH

28. Did you think the technique taught was effective? Y/N

Y - Plt Sgt -
Y - Team Leader -
Y - Team Leader -
Y - Team Leader - fast and aggressive
Y - Team Leader - if you do it the way it is taught, it works
Y - Team Leader -

29. Did you think the search procedures taught were effective? (Inner and outer cordon, search team) Y/N

Y - Plt Sgt - both inner and outer cordon
Y - Team Leader -
Y - Team Leader -
Y - Team Leader - if you do it the way it was taught, it works

Y - Team Leader -

N - Team Leader - outer collapsed

30. What aspects of the technique did not work well?

Team Leader - I don't like wall body weapon, I can't shoot left handed and if it comes down to it I won't

Team Leader - the aggressors should be more distinctive, they wore black, half of the city wears black

31. How can the technique be improved?

Team Leader - individual searcher

Team Leader - more MOUT training

32. Did you think the task organization of your unit was effective? Y/N

No answer

33. Make comments on command and control for your element as part of the inner or outer cordon for the house search. (Refer to your role as Plt Cmdr, Plt Sgt, Sqd Ldr, or Fire Team Ldr).

No answer.

Event Eight Feedback Summary

Unit: 3rd Platoon **Mission:** Day security patrol/snap VCP

Total BLUFOR in box: 21

OPFOR: none

Role Players: 2 role players in 1 vehicle

Overall Comments:

- Patrol took 3 hours and 22 minutes to cover 34 blocks on foot, including time to conduct snap VCP.
- Took patrol 1 hour and 19 minutes to cover 22 blocks on foot prior to conducting snap VCP.
- Used 5Ts to insert and extract patrol.
- Train cut-off part of patrol during movement.
- Teams failed to continue to orbit VCP, became focused in.
- CAAT had ICOMs to communicate with ground forces.
- CAAT vehicle had 5 Marines, extra security man.
- CAAT team leader felt that having only 1 CAAT vehicle made it more difficult to provide support and security.
- QRF not deployed

1. How many casualties/POWs did your element have and/or inflict? N/A

2. Did you conduct a Casualty Evacuation (CASEVAC) for these casualties? N/A

3. In your opinion, did your element accomplish its mission? Y / N

Y - PL

Y - Team Leader

Y - Team Leader

Y - Team Leader

Y - CAAT

GENERAL QUESTIONS FOR ENTIRE UNIT (COMPLETE FOR PATROLLING AND ANY OTHER TASK COMPLETED DURING EXPERIMENT)

4. What helped most during patrolling?

PL - having good communication with my team leaders

Team Leader - communication and taking initiative and action

Team Leader - bounding over watch, knowing where everyone was

Team Leader - the satellite patrol, being able to move in and out of the houses

CAAT - the extra security at having 5 Marines in the vehicle, having ICOMs to monitor troop movement was helpful

5. What helped most when conducting vehicle searches-

PL - rehearsals and techniques

Team Leader - letting the guy that knew most about cars to search

6. What did not work well during patrolling?

Team Leader - the focus of the main mission, which was to patrol

Team Leader - need improvement on 360 security

CAAT - having only 1 vehicle is difficult to offer good support and security, it is not a good idea to send one vehicle out to recon an area alone

7. What did not work well when conducting vehicle searches?

PL - no one is comfortable with not having a weapon during the search

8. In your opinion, how well trained was your element to conduct this mission?

BILLET	N/A	POOR	AVG	A/A	EX	O/S	REMARKS
Platoon Leader					X		
Asst Platoon Ldr	X						
Team Leader			X				
Team Leader				X			
Team Leader				X			
Team Leader	X						
CAAT Team Leader				X			

9. What specific training best prepared your element during this event?

PL - going through BUST - prior practice

Team Leader - BUST

Team Leader - learning from last patrol

Team Leader - the training in BUST before we got here

CAAT - BUST helped and the experience from the previous two days really helped worked out the kinks

10. What training does your group think was needed but did not receive for this mission?

CAAT - patrolling with 1 vehicle

11. List three (3) things your unit learned during this event that would help Marines in the future:

1.

PL - communication is essential

Team Leader - better communication

Team Leader - cover and concealment better

Team Leader - to not let the driver shut the door

CAAT - how to patrol with 1 vehicle and still offer good support and security

2.

PL - BPT missions must be planned for

Team Leader - not getting lazy at the end

Team Leader - bounding worked better

Team Leader - to not yell out weapon

CAAT - having 5 marines in the vehicle helped with vehicle security a lot

3.

PL - communication with higher is difficult in urban areas

Team Leader - staying focused on the mission

Team Leader - weapons and eyeballs

Team Leader - to try and talk to the people more

CAAT - need to have better communications with gunner

12. Was any of your unit's equipment or vehicles damaged or destroyed, including attachments to your unit? List type of equipment, how damage was inflicted and location. N/A

13. What other organizational or equipment changes does your group recommend to make the element more effective than it was?

PL - possibly add one more satellite event

Team Leader - radios and maps for each man

14. Use the remaining space to make any other comments you have about THIS PARTICULAR event: None

KEY LEADER'S QUESTIONNAIRE: TO BE COMPLETED BY PLT CMDR, PLT SGT, SQD LDR'S, FIRE TEAM LDR'S, AND ATTACHMENT CMDR'S

PK/PE PATROLLING

15. Did you think the satelliting technique taught was effective? Y/N

Y - PL - they worked well at every step

Y - Team Leader - everyone was aware where everyone was located

Y - Team Leader

Y - Team Leader

Y - CAAT

16. Did you think the task organization of your unit was effective? Y/N

Y - PL - it was very easy to keep track of the units

Y - Team Leader - when the vehicle was stopped, all teams got to positions immediately

Y - Team Leader

Y - Team Leader

Y - CAAT - it would have been better with a second vehicle

17. Did your task organization allow you the flexibility to transition from "block II" to "block III" intensity? Y/N

Y - PL - it would have had we received the mission

Y - Team Leader

Y - CAAT

18. Was command and control of your element easier or more difficult? Y/N

Y - PL - easier communication made if simple

Y - Team Leader - stayed in communication at all times

Y - Team Leader

Y - CAAT - it was easier as far as comm and having to know where another element was but it was more difficult because without that additional vehicle we had to cover more ground

19. What aspects of the satelliting or patrolling technique did not work well?

Team Leader - ...need to think where I am going before

CAAT - trying to cover a large area with only 1 vehicle

20. How can the technique be improved?

Team Leader - think about where I'm going, maybe two streets up, two houses over, etc...

Team Leader - practice, more practice

CHECKPOINT OPERATIONS - SNAP (VCP)

21. Did you think the SNAP VCP technique taught was effective? Y/N

Y - PL - I think a snap VCP will be determined on scene

Y - Team Leader - it worked, but I was never taught a proper technique

Y - Team Leader

Y - Team Leader

22. What aspects of the SNAP VCP technique did not work well?

Team Leader - too many Marines close in, should spread out

23. How can the technique be improved? No answer.

Event Nine Feedback Summary

Unit: 2nd Platoon **Mission:** Day security patrol

Total BLUFOR in box: 24

OPFOR: 3

Role Players: None

Overall Comments:

- Patrol took 2 hours and 45 minutes to cover 52 blocks on foot.
- Slow to react to initial OPFOR contact just as they departed firm base.
- Much better use of dispersion and communications.
- Radios enabled greater distance and maneuver.
- PRC-148 still having problems, battery problems.

1. How many casualties/POWs did your element have and/or inflict? None

2. In your opinion, did your element accomplish its mission? Y / N

Y - Team Leader

Y - Team Leader

Y - CAAT

GENERAL QUESTIONS FOR ENTIRE UNIT (COMPLETE FOR PATROLLING AND ANY OTHER TASK COMPLETED DURING EXPERIMENT)

3. What helped most during patrolling -

PL - tactics improving with more practice in real city...radios

Team Leader - PRRs make it much better to communicate w/team

Team Leader - dispersion

Team Leader - excellent comm - MBITR and PRR, excellent patrol route and mapping

CAAT - good comm between us and the HQ element, good comm between the team leaders in the element allowed us to plan our routes and cover them without worrying about fratricide

4. What did not work well during patrolling?

PL - radios, lost comm a few times but had APL backing up

Team Leader - too many people trying to talk on MBITR

Team Leader - comm

CAAT - when the element chose narrow, one way streets, it canalized us and limited our satellite and flanking capabilities and forced us to either canalize or detach a block or two away

5. In your opinion, how well trained was your element to conduct this mission?

BILLET	N/A	POOR	AVG	A/A	EX	O/S	REMARKS
Platoon Leader				X			
Asst Platoon Ldr	X						
Team Leader			X				
Team Leader					X		
Team Leader				X			
Team Leader				X			
CAAT Team Leader					X		

6. What specific training best prepared your element during this event?

PL - practicing satellite more realistic more room to maneuver than at MOUT facility
 Team Leader - squad and team leaders experience and knowledge
 Team Leader - prior patrolling and learning from mistakes
 Team Leader - satelliting patrolling
 CAAT - reaction time to contact was well rehearsed and helped us provide excellent cover and support

7. What training does your group think was needed but did not receive for this mission?

Team Leader - more MOUT training
 Team Leader - comm/hand and arm signals
 CAAT - I think we are well trained, we could have "what if" all day....

8. List three (3) things your unit learned during this event that would help Marines in the future:

1.
 - PL - dispersion
 - Team Leader - team bounding works well in MOUT
 - Team Leader - dispersion
 - Team Leader - how different it was to patrol in a city
 - CAAT - satellite patrolling
2.
 - PL - movement
 - Team Leader - PRRs help a lot if every Marine has one
 - Team Leader - better communication between each other
 - Team Leader - how to operate PRR and MBITR
 - CAAT - finding cover in urban areas
3.
 - PL - communication
 - Team Leader - mutual support needs to be held at all times
 - Team Leader - learned how to cover themselves better
 - CAAT - vehicle checkpoints in urban areas

9. Was any of your unit's equipment or vehicles damaged or destroyed, including attachments to your unit?

- 10. Team Leader - have CAAT have a different freq and another Marine in HQ carry another radio with that freq**
- 11. What other organizational or equipment changes does your group recommend to make the element more effective than it was?**
 Team Leader - have CAAT use a separate radio
 Team Leader - less deuce gear, break down the gear
- 12. Use the remaining space to make any other comments you have about THIS PARTICULAR event:**
 Team Leader - the PRR/MBITR was the key part to making this patrol successful

KEY LEADER'S QUESTIONNAIRE: TO BE COMPLETED BY PLT CMDR, PLT SGT, SQD LDR'S, FIRE TEAM LDR'S, AND ATTACHMENT CMDR'S


PK/PE PATROLLING

- 13. Did you think the satelliting technique taught was effective? Y/N**
 Y - PL - we are getting better at it, good form of patrolling
 Y - Team Leader - hard to tell where everyone is from enemy standpoint, can cover more ground
 Y - Team Leader - covered more area, covered more ground effectively
 Y - Team Leader
- 14. Did you think the task organization of your unit was effective? Y/N**
 Y - PL
 Y - Team Leader - it normally is but it really wasn't used
 Y - Team Leader - team leader placed Marines in designated spots
 Y - Team Leader
- 15. Did your task organization allow you the flexibility to transition from "block II" to "block III" intensity? Y/N**
 Y - PL
 Y - Team Leader
 Y - Team Leader
- 16. Was command and control of your element easier or more difficult? Y/N**
 Y - PL - easier, we are getting better with the radios
 Y - Team Leader - PRRs made it easy
 Y - Team Leader - easier, radio usage was key
 Y - Team Leader - easier I had all team members equipped with radios
- 17. What aspects of the satelliting or patrolling technique did not work well?**
 Team Leader - in confined spaces
 Team Leader - on areas that were enclosed or wide open

18. How can the technique be improved?

Team Leader – teach.



Event Ten



Role Player Houses 2040 Allen



20 Feb 02
1st Platoon (+)
Security Patrol
1954-2124



Patrol T/O:

The platoon was split. The Plt Sgt commanded the patrol that started from the western most start point. The Platoon Commander started at the eastern most start point.

Platoon Commander	Section	Plt Sgt	Section
	HQ	4	3
	TM	4	4
	TM	4	4
	TM	4	4
	CAAT	3	3 (HMG Variant)
	CAAT	3	3 (HMG Variant)

Entire platoon, split into two elements trucked to separate start pts. The platoon used a split formation during the approach to the objective area. 6 OPFOR were located in house at 2040 Allen and fired upon the first Marines seen in the vicinity. The Plt Sgt's patrol, starting from the western start point, was first engaged. The Platoon Commander's patrol was separated from the Plt Sgt after firing started by a train that bisected the two routes. Use of NVGs was not effective. A definite loss of momentum was observed in transitioning from Block II to Block III operations, especially after leaders were hit. Employment of CAAT was troublesome because of lack of SA on friendly locations and trajectory of fires. Fences and dead end streets hindered CAAT vehicle mobility.

Event Ten Feedback Summary

Unit: 1st Platoon **Mission:** Night security patrol and house search

Total BLUFOR in box: 43

OPFOR: 6

Role Players: none

Overall Comments:

- Full platoon event.
- Plt Sgt's element on west side of route took 46 minutes to cover 10 blocks to target house.
- Plt Commander's element on east side of route took 1 hour and 10 minutes to cover 14 blocks, including time when movement held up by passing train.
- Split formation during approach to objective area, got split by long train.
- Lesson on effects of trains and need for crossing points - better map recon/intel.
- Finally found tunnel under rail bed.
- Some loss of momentum moving from Block II to Block III, especially when leaders are hit.
- Some tried to use NVGs, but not successful - need training and equipment.
- Untrained PFCs as team leaders in some cases seemed to be a problem.
- CAAT focused too much toward inside, and 50 cal's could not be used as base of fire - friendlies in way/lack of SA.
- CAAT used chain link fence as RPG screen.
- CAAT mobility hindered by fences and dead ends

1. How many casualties/POWs did your element have and/or inflict?

ELEMENT	KIA	WIA	PW/EPW
OPFOR	3	3	0
BLUFOR	7	6	0
Noncombatants	0	0	0

2. Did you conduct a Casualty Evacuation (CASEVAC) for these casualties? No

3. In your opinion, did your element accomplish its mission? Y / N

Y - Plt Sgt - we cleared the house of the enemy

Y - Team Leader 5 - we patrolled along the route, provided security and executed any orders given by PL

Y - Team Leader 6 - ...but took massive casualties

Y - CAAT 1 - we provided security around the houses and bounded overwatch for foot patrols, when contact made we moved into a position to secure the objective

Y - CAAT 2 - provided security and mobile heavy gun support for foot patrol

N - PL - compromised before link up....

N - Team Leader 1 - there were too many people on the comm, no one was listening
N - Team Leader 2
N - Team Leader 3
N - Team Leader 4
N - CAAT 3 - comm was congested and transmissions were late and delayed
N - CAAT 4

GENERAL QUESTIONS FOR ENTIRE UNIT (COMPLETE FOR PATROLLING AND ANY OTHER TASK COMPLETED DURING EXPERIMENT)

4. What helped most during patrolling -

PL - communication between team leaders to PL
Team Leader 1 - in the beginning the patrolling was working well, team members were paying attention more than before
Team Leader 2 - tactics and techniques
Team Leader 3 - patrolling worked good except for comm
Team Leader 4 - communications, techniques of patrolling, keeping track of where everyone was, satellite patrol worked for covering the general area
Team Leader 5 - communication between teams, the sense of awareness and every team knowing their exact position
Team Leader 6 - communicating, leading all other fire teams and other squad to where the enemy was at
CAAT 1 - CAATs bounding and pre-planning for the mission
CAAT 2 - comm was more up to speed, felt I had more SA I always knew where my other vehicle and foot elements were
CAAT 3 - locational awareness, map

5. What helped most when conducting hasty house searches-

Plt Sgt - flashlights

6. What did not work well during patrolling?

PL - once shots fired, the patrol did not bound well, 360 security was lost
Team Leader 1- there were too many people on the comm, some elements were moving too slow
Team Leader 3 - nothing worked this time,
Plt Sgt - too many people talking on the comm, team leaders not communicating with the PL and APL on their position
Team Leader 4 - knowledge of streets...
Team Leader 5 - NVGs inside dark houses are worthless, it was absolutely too dark for NVGs to work and nothing can be seen, Marines carrying too many radios makes comm confusing when monitoring 2 nets at once
CAAT 1 - too much traffic on the comm, improper use of CAAT assets when contact was made
CAAT 2 - had a few comm problems, also when received contact, there was not much coordination between patrol and veh attachments at the beginning
CAAT 3 - vehicle link-ups

CAAT 4 - lack of time to prepare for patrol, bad comm led to loss track of where my team was located, bad intel my other team to a bad position

7. What did not work well when conducting hasty house searches?

Plt Sgt - NVGs, intel on knowing that it was a duplex
 Team Leader 5 - NVGs, maybe they would work better with PEQ2
 CAAT 4 - the 50cals didn't get oriented correctly too much chatter or not

8. In your opinion, how well trained was your element to conduct this mission?

BILLET	N/A	POOR	AVG	A/A	EX	O/S	REMARKS
Platoon Leader				X			
Platoon Sgt			X				
Team Leader			X				
Team Leader					X		
Team Leader				X			
Team Leader				X			
Team Leader					X		
Team Leader				X			
CAAT Team Leader				X			
CAAT Team Leader				X			
CAAT Team Leader					X		

9. What specific training best prepared your element during this event?

PL - 2 and 1/2 days of work up at the MOUT and BUST for the senior Marines in the Plt
 Team Leader 1 - patrolling first only on the squad level
 Team Leader 2 - BUST training and patrolling and land navigation
 Plt Sgt - training at MOUT
 Team Leader 4 - MOUT training in MOUT town
 Team Leader 5 - more of the same training
 Team Leader 6 - BUST
 CAAT 1 - BUST
 CAAT 2 - BUST course
 CAAT 3 - MOUT

10. What training does your group think was needed but did not receive for this mission?

PL - multiple patrol procedures (link-up, react drills, etc.)
 Team Leader 1 - more training as a platoon level in a MOUT environment
 Team Leader 3 - more training like this in a real urban environment
 Plt Sgt - more training
 Team Leader 4 - contact elements
 Team Leader 5 - going in houses with flashlights and clearing it
 CAAT 1 - working with a platoon with 4 CAAT vehicles
 CAAT 3 - communications with ground troop for intel on area
 CAAT 4 - more training utilizing CAAT with patrols

11. List three (3) things your unit learned during this event that would help Marines in the future:

1.

- PL - combat prep/coordination must begin ASAP after the warning order
- Team Leader 1 - how to move better as a platoon
- Team Leader 2 - better comm with TL
- Team Leader 3 - more training like this
- Plt Sgt - less Marines get comm
- Team Leader 4 - Know your map
- Team Leader 5 - to use flashlights
- Team Leader 6 - no matter what casualties will be taken in an urban environment
- CAAT 1 - separate comm for CAAT vehicles only
- CAAT 2 - force comm procedures to increase SA and coordination
- CAAT 3 - less traffic on net
- CAAT 4 - that platoon should use assets before clearing houses

2.

- PL - communication at night is vital BPT have other signal/comm plan should the primary go down
- Team Leader 1 - not all people need comm
- Team Leader 3 - better comm
- Plt Sgt - team leaders need to take more control of the ir teams
- Team Leader 4 - have a plan
- Team Leader 5 - need to keep visual with all team members
- Team Leader 6 - communication is really important
- CAAT 1 - stress proper use of CAAT teams for contact
- CAAT 2 - make sure to have security if vehicle is stopped
- CAAT 3 - alt to comm if comm fails
- CAAT 4 - when fired at, all elements went straight to meet with force instead of regrouping

3.

- PL - Actions on objective need to be rehearsed prior to step off
- Team Leader 1 - know where all team in our patrol are at all times
- Team Leader 3 - better communications between squads
- Plt Sgt - team leaders need to take cover and listen for what to do
- Team Leader 4 - don't loose control of team when fired shots
- Team Leader 5 - communicate at all times
- Team Leader 6 - dispersion between the team helped keep them alive
- CAAT 1 - make sure foot troops give some sort of security for vehicle
- CAAT 2 - make sure to stop and set in a good position that provides the most cover yet allows gunner to cover avenues of approach
- CAAT 3 - area awareness (ie train crossing)
- CAAT 4 - that all vehicles need comm with one another like fire teams

12. Was any of your unit's equipment or vehicles damaged or destroyed, including attachments to your unit? List type of equipment, how damage was inflicted and location. None.

13. What other organizational or equipment changes does your group recommend to make the element more effective than it was?

PL - Less wires, headsets are bulky and if you are wearing two, they get in the way and you can't hear outside noises when you are monitoring multiple units

Team Leader 1 - better comm

Team Leader 4 - more effective comm

Team Leader 5 - change NVG clearing and searches to using flashlights

Team Leader 6 - get rid of MBTIRs

CAAT 1 - CAAT section leader needs total control of vehicles not other Marines

CAAT 3 - GPS

CAAT 4 - more time between warning order and moving out

14. Use the remaining space to make any other comments you have about THIS

PARTICULAR event:

CAAT 1 - separate comms for CAAT and 240G

CAAT 3 - many moving parts, too many unnecessary changes to original plan

CAAT 4 - poor comm between vehicles led to failure of CAAT mission, we had no idea where each other was until it was too late

KEY LEADER'S QUESTIONNAIRE: TO BE COMPLETED BY PLT CMDR, PLT SGT, SQD LDR'S, FIRE TEAM LDR'S, AND ATTACHMENT CMDR'S

PK/PE PATROLLING

15. Did you think the satelliting technique taught was effective? Y/N

Y - PL -

Y - Team Leader 1 - because in the beginning the patrol was moving smooth

Y - Team Leader 4 -

Y - Team Leader 6 - techniques that were taught were used and they were effective

Y - CAAT 2 - it works well at keeping enemy off guard

Y - CAAT 3 -

N - Plt Sgt - the 1st team was left out in the front by themselves

16. Did you think the task organization of your unit was effective? Y/N

Y - Team Leader 4 - Everybody knew the way the patrol was organized and who was in command

Y - Team Leader 6 - everything was well organized

Y - CAAT 1 - only if CAAT assets are used properly when contact was made

Y - CAAT 2 - we work well when attached to ground mounted troop, it allows for mutual support

N - PL - I still have problems tasking the APL

N - Team Leader 1 - because there was too many moving parts

N - Plt Sgt - we did not plan for all missions
N - CAAT 3

17. Did your task organization allow you the flexibility to transition from “block II” to “block III” intensity? Y/N

Y - PL

Y - Team Leader 1 - because there were two patrols and we had more people on the objective

Y - Team Leader 4

Y - Team Leader 5 - we went from Block II to block III

Y - Team Leader 6 - we did transition to block III successfully

N - Plt Sgt - the way we planned it did not come close to happening

N - CAAT 1 - foot patrol did not allow CAAT opportunity to suppress building for entry

N - CAAT 3

18. Was command and control of your element easier or more difficult? . Y/N

Y - Team Leader 4 - it was easy to communicate with Plt leader

Y - Team Leader 6 - easier because I only had a 3 man team

Y - CAAT 2 - easier than previous patrols because of proper comm

N - PL - more difficult because we had 2 patrol satelliting in close proximity

N - Team Leader 1 - more difficult because there were too many people on the comm

N - Plt Sgt - too much traffic on comm

N - Team Leader 5 - it was kind of difficult, more internal comm in between team members is a must

N - CAAT 1 - more difficult because of comm

N - CAAT 3 - difficult due to congested net

19. What aspects of the satelliting or patrolling technique did not work well?

PL - comm procedures did not work well and are key to any control of the patrol

Team Leader 1 - comm (MBITRS)

Plt Sgt - teams were getting lost

Team Leader 5 - using the NVGs at night street lights blind when NVGs are used

CAAT 3 - many dead ends along route

20. How can the technique be improved?

PL - more training with gear we will have in the MOUT environment

Team Leader 1 - practice it more

Plt Sgt - tighten up the formation

CAAT 2 - keep practicing comm procedures

CAAT 3 - better route planning

HASTY HOUSE SEARCH

21. Did you think the technique taught was effective? Y/N

N - Plt Sgt - didn't use the technique taught


22. Did you think the task organization of your unit was effective? Y/N

N - Plt Sgt - people didn't do the tasks they were tasked with.


Event Eleven



Objective Site 401 Palm



21 Feb 02
Company Raid
0630-0930



OB

Company T/O:
Most of the company was employed in the raid. 1st Plt maintained security at the company patrol base.

HQ	5
2 nd Plt	35
3 rd Plt	40
Sniper	4
CAAT	12 (3 vehicles)
Guns	w/ 3 rd

The company HQs lost SA during the raid while engaged on the railroad tracks to the NW of the objective. Forces seemed confused during actions on the objective. Radio were not used to advantage to pass info and coordinate movement. Booby traps were identified and higher notified, but not marked. A casualty collection point was established. Friendly fire incident was witnessed through the wall of the objective building, hiding behind bushes, lack of appreciation for cover vs. concealment. CAAT personnel felt they could have been employed more effectively to suppress and isolate the objective site.

Event 11 Feedback Summary

Unit: Company K, 3rd Bn 8th Marines **Mission:** Company raid

Total BLUFOR in box: 96

OPFOR: 14

Role Players: none

Overall Comments:

- Co HQ is engaged on tracks, SA low.
- A lot of confusion on roles and missions, waited till morning of attack to issue orders, no leader recon performed.
- Most O/Cs mention that forces seemed confused on actions at the objective.
- Did not seem to use radios to advantage to pass info and coordinate movement.
- Seemed to lose tactical edge - bunched up, focused in, little 360 security, focused inside.
- Booby traps identified and higher notified, but not marked (during attack).
- 2nd Plt Sgt gets info about site (**after departure from firm base**) from squad that patrolled route yesterday, moves them to lead element during movement to objective.
- **Friendly fire** incident through wall of building, hiding behind bushes, cover vs. concealment issues.
- Established CCPs – initially at railroad tracks, later inside warehouse, QRF evacuated casualties by truck during consolidation.
- CAAT personnel felt that they could have been used to provide suppressive fire during assault as well as isolating area

1. How many casualties/POWs did your element have and/or inflict?

ELEMENT	KIA	WIA	PW/EPW
OPFOR	10	0	3
BLUFOR	25	14	0
Noncombatants	0	0	0

2. Did you conduct a Casualty Evacuation (CASEVAC) for these casualties? QRF evacuated casualties during consolidation,

3. In your opinion, did your element accomplish its mission? Y / N.

2nd Platoon

Y - 2 PL - cleared the target of enemy forces

Y - Team Leader, 3rd Sqd - we were security

N - 3rd Squad ldr - my sqd was not used at all and the mission seemed to fail

3rd Platoon

Y - 3 PL - eliminated the enemy from the objective

Y - 1st Squad ldr - mission completed, but more lives could have been saved if there was more info on which building to take down

N - 2nd Sqd ldr - no we died

Y - 3rd Sqd ldr - killed all enemy personnel and occupied the obj

Guns

N - Sqd ldr - no, they died all of them (ed. - not really)

Y - Sniper

CAAT

Y - CAAT 1 - ...but I feel CAAT could have been better utilized...suppressive fire before the assault element reached its objective

Y - CAAT 2

Y - CAAT 3

Y - CAAT 4

GENERAL QUESTIONS FOR ENTIRE UNIT (COMPLETE FOR PATROLLING AND ANY OTHER TASK COMPLETED DURING EXPERIMENT)

4. What worked well (tactics, techniques, procedures, or equipment) during this experiment and helped your squad accomplish its mission?

2nd Platoon

Plt ldr - tactics and techniques helped and communications

Eng squad ldr - communication between the Marine and the NCOs been able to take charge when highers were eliminated

3rd Sqd ldr - the PRR radio, being able to talk to one another

3rd Platoon

1st Sqd ldr - senior leadership

2nd Sqd ldr - communication

CAAT

CAAT 1 - communication between vehicles

CAAT 2 - better comm

CAAT 3 - comm, situational awareness

CAAT 4 - CAAT vehicles moved directly to blocking positions, helped us see where OP4 was moving

5. What did not work (tactics, techniques, procedures, or equipment) well during this experiment?

2nd Platoon

Plt ldr - we were at a disadvantage not being allowed to use mortars or anything above 20mm

Eng sqd ldr - keeping distance

3rd Sqd ldr - comm with higher

Team Leader, 3rd Sqd - canalizing the entire company

3rd Platoon

1st Sqd ldr - during the assault we were supposed to be support.... changed to the assault, and the new Marines were not efficient in clearing rooms in MOUT

3rd Sqd ldr - no dispersion

Guns

Sqd ldr - new Marines, no training in their own MOS 0331, too much useless gear - ie optics for a daytime raid

CAAT

CAAT 1 - utilization of the CAAT section...could have used us for fire support when compromised, suppressive before the assault

CAAT 3 - enemy vehicle description, comm

CAAT 4 - when shots fired, Panther 3 moved into Panther 2's line of fire

6. In your opinion, how well trained was your element to conduct this mission?

BILLET	N/A	POOR	AVG	A/A	EX	O/S
2 nd Platoon Leader			X			
1 st Squad Leader				X		
2 nd Squad Leader				X		
3 rd Squad Leader			X			
3 rd Platoon Leader		X				
1 st Squad Leader			X			
2 nd Squad Leader				X		
3 rd Squad Leader				X		
Engineer Squad Leader			X			
Guns Squad Leader				X		
CAAT 1 Team Leader			X			
CAAT 2 Team Leader			X			
CAAT 3 Team Leader			X			
CAAT 4 Team Leader			X			

7. What specific training best prepared your element during this event?

2nd Platoon

PL - company attack at BUST helped prepare and get used to coordinating at the company level

Eng sqd ldr - repeated dry runs

Team Leader, 3rd Sqd - BUST

3rd Platoon

3 PL - conducting MOUT training for the unit leadership

1st Sqd ldr - senior personnel at house clearing

2nd Sqd ldr - room clearing

3rd Sqd ldr - everything

Guns

Sqd ldr - BUST

CAAT

CAAT 1 - basic CAAT procedures combined with MOUT tactics

CAAT 2 - BUST

CAAT 3 - MOUT

CAAT 4 - vehicle operations

8. What training does your group think was needed but did not receive for this mission?

2nd Platoon

- PL - practicing actual raids themselves
- 3rd Sqd ldr - a lot of work on everything
- Team Leader, 3rd Sqd - a lot of fire team training

3rd Platoon

- PL - training for all the new Marines
- 1st Sqd ldr - we received the training but the new Marines are going to need more training on room clearing
- 2nd Sqd ldr - more intel

Guns

- Squad ldr - its own MOS training - 0331

CAAT

- CAAT 1 - company understanding how well CAAT can help in different ways

9. List three (3) things your unit learned during this event that would help Marines in the future:

1.

2nd Platoon

- Plt ldr - keep better track of accountability during actual combat
- Eng sqd ldr - above ground bunkers, how to make
- 3rd Sqd ldr - patrolling
- Team Leader, 3rd Sqd - patrolling

3rd Platoon

- 3 Plt ldr - don't fall in love with your plan
- 1st Sqd ldr - more practice in MOU
- 2nd Sqd ldr - check for traps better
- 3rd Sqd ldr - need to keep dispersion

Guns

- Sqd ldr - comm
- Sniper - options for raid support

CAAT

- CAAT 1 - make decisions and stay with it
- CAAT 2 - did good job with CAAT on their own freq
- CAAT 4 - make sure drive or gunner can see you during vehicle security

2.

2nd Platoon

- Plt ldr - be prepared to assume the leadership position in case team leaders and higher commanders die
- Eng sqd ldr - how important wire obstacles are
- 3rd Sqd ldr - searching houses
- Team Leader, 3rd Sqd - house searches

3rd Platoon

- 3 Plt ldr - support element will always assault
- 2nd Sqd ldr - organization

3rd Sqd ldr - check for booby traps

Guns

Sqd ldr - standing post

Sniper - patrolling technique

CAAT

CAAT 1 - communication

CAAT 2 - understood ROE better

CAAT 4 - cutting off routes to objective kept enemy vehicles from getting to objective

3.

2nd Platoon

Plt ldr - be prepared to assume the mission of another unit if the battlefield changes

Eng squad ldr - explosive booby traps

Team Leader, 3rd Sqd - thinking on their own

3rd Platoon

3 Plt ldr - every man should carry 2 grenades

3rd Sqd ldr - avoid fratricide

Guns

Sqd ldr bunkers

Sniper - egress and link-up procedures

CAAT

CAAT 1 - always defend yourself

10. Was any of your unit's equipment or vehicles damaged or destroyed, including attachments to your unit? List type of equipment, how damage was inflicted and location. No

11. What other organizational or equipment changes does your group recommend to make the element more effective than it was?

2nd Platoon

PL - would be better to have more time to prepare for the mission, in combat we will not always have the luxury of time, but that would have helped us to be more effective as well as more informative about the enemy

3rd Sqd ldr - learning how to patrol

3rd Platoon

1st Sqd ldr - more training of the new Marines

3rd Sqd ldr - need grenades

CAAT

CAAT 2 - ICOM

CAAT 3 - medium machinegun

12. Use the remaining space to make any other comments you have about THIS PARTICULAR event:

2nd Platoon

Plt ldr - there was too much gear associated with this evolution

3rd Sqd ldr - company needs to learn more, not ready for a real mission

Team Leader, 3rd Sqd - unprepared

3rd Platoon

PL - the training we received here was essential for the new Marines, I am glad to have been a part of it and was pleased with the scenarios we participated in

1st Sqd ldr - ...a big breakdown in comm between the two platoons about the building being cleared...

CAAT 2 - still think they should prep the building with automatic fire before entering in a hard hit

CAAT 3 - vehicle could have been more effective.

